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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986' in
response to calls for more effective means to combat the growing
problem of money laundering-"the process by which one conceals
the existence, illegal source, or illegal application of income, and
then disguises that income to make it appear legitimate."2 The
most far-reaching of the Act's provisions are the two new criminal
statutes codified at sections 1956 and 1957 of Title 18 of the
United States Code. Although both of these statutes have been
1. Pub. L. No. 99-570, tit. I, subtit. H, §§ 1351-1366, 100 Stat. 3207-18 (codified in'part
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)).
2. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, INTERIM REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND
MONEY LAUNDERING 7 (1984) [hereinafter CASH CONNECTION].
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called money laundering statutes,3 only section 1956 criminalizes
solely conduct necessarily related to an effort to conceal or disguise
income. Section 1957, in contrast, crimmalizes certain conduct
without regard to whether it is part of an effort to conceal or dis-
guise income. Entitled "Engaging in monetary transactions in
property derived from specified unlawful activity," section 1957
criminalizes "knowingly engag[ing] or attempt[ing] to engage in a
monetary transaction in criminally derived property [that is] of a
value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful
activity ,,4 A conviction under section 1957 carries a maximum
penalty of ten years incarceration,5 criminal fines,6 and the forfei-
ture of all property involved in or traceable to the offense. 7
Despite the enactment of section 1957 as part of a comprehen-
sive money laundering control package, Congress omitted the
money laundering element from section 1957 with the very pur-
pose of criminalizing a category of conduct that is completely unre-
lated to money laundering activity- engaging in certain ordinary
commercial transactions that, while involving criminally derived
property, are in no way designed to conceal or disguise that prop-
erty 8 Moreover, Congress specifically intended that liability under
section 1957 should extend both to those who actually engage in
the criminal activity that generates illegitimate funds and to those
who merely receive or otherwise handle illegitimate funds while
providing ordinary, legitimate goods or services. Indeed, the legis-
lative history of section 1957 reveals that Congress fully intended
that the archetypical section 1957 defendant would be the other-
wise law-abiding citizen who is alleged to have simply knowingly
accepted illegitimate funds as payment for ordinary, legitimate
goods or services, or otherwise knowingly handled illegitimate
funds while providing these services. The principal legislative doc-
3. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-105.100 (Supp. 1992-1).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (1988).
5. Id. § 1957(b)(1).
6. Id. § 1957(b)(1)-(2) (providing that a court may impose any fine authorized under Ti-
tle 18 or, alternatively, not more than twice the amount of criminally derived property in-
volved in the transaction).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 982(a). In addition, commission of an offense under § 1957 may give rise to
civil forfeiture proceedings. See id. § 981(a)(1)(A).
8. H.R. REP. No. 855, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1986) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 8551.
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ument explaining Congress' purposes in enacting section 1957
opens its explanation of the statute as follows:
A person who engages in a financial transaction using the pro-
ceeds of a designated offense would violate this section if such
person knew that the subject of the transaction were the pro-
ceeds of any crime. The [House Judiciary Committee's Subcom-
mittee on Crime] is aware that every person who does business
with a drug trafficker, or any other criminal, does so at some
substantial risk if that person knows that they are being paid
with the proceeds of a crime and then uses that money in a fi-
nancial transaction. As argued by [Representative Clay] Shaw,
"I am concerned about a broker who might take a quarter of a
million dollars of cash down to Fort Lauderdale taking that as
payment. I am concerned about the realtor who is going to make
a $50,000 or $100,000 commission on a deal by knowingly doing
it. I am sick and tired of watching people sit back and say, 'I am
not part of the problem, I am not committing the crime, and,
therefore, my hands are clean even though I know the money is
dirty I am handling.['] The only way we will get at this problem
is to let the whole community, the whole population, know they
are part of the problem and they could very well be convicted of
it if they knowingly take these funds. If we can make the drug
dealers' money worthless, then we have really struck a chord,
and we have hit him where he bruises, and that is right in the
pocketbook You have outstanding business people who
are otherwise totally moral who are accepting these funds and
profiting greatly from drug trafficking that is going on through-
out this country, and this will put a stop to it."9
Attacking criminal activity indirectly by threatening not just
criminals but also those who deal commercially with criminals is
not a new concept. Federal laws prohibiting the sale or receipt of
various types of stolen property have a long history 10 Sec-
tion 1957, however, is fundamentally different from its predeces-
sors because of its expansive definition of the term "criminally de-
rived property" The term applies not only to funds stolen or
9. Id. at 13 (quoting Markup by the Subcomm. on Crime of H.R. 5077, Money Launder-
ing Control Act of 1986 [hereinafter Markup of H.R. 5077], at 22-23 (July 16, 1986)).
10. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2313 (criminalizing the sale or receipt of stolen vehicles); id. § 2315
(criminalizing the sale or receipt of stolen goods, securities, moneys, or fraudulent state tax
stamps); id. § 2317 (criminalizing the sale or receipt of stolen livestock).
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obtained by fraud, but also to a vast category of property colloqui-
ally referred to as "profits" of criminal activity, such as a drug
dealer's income from illegal drug sales. 1 For this reason, the
probability of a conviction based on marginal or insufficient evi-
dence is substantially greater under section 1957 than under its
predecessors. Many juries in section 1957 cases might simply as-
sume-once the government has established that the source of
funds involved in a monetary transaction either was a professional
criminal, fitted common stereotypes of how a professional criminal
"looks and acts," or was simply "reputed" to be a professional
criminal-that those facts alone are sufficient to justify further
findings 1) that the transaction involved funds derived from crimi-
nal activity and, correspondingly, 2) that any individual (including
the defendant) who dealt commercially with that person "must
have known" that criminally derived property was involved.
Indeed, in the very first reported case under section 1957 involv-
ing the archetypical section 1957 defendant-a defendant alleged
to have knowingly handled tainted funds but not alleged to have
engaged in the criminal activity that generated the funds-the jury
returned a verdict of guilty notwithstanding the lack of any evi-
dence affirmatively showing that the defendant knew that the
funds were derived from criminal activity The defendant in
United States v. Campbell2 was a real estate agent who had ar-
ranged for the purchase of a home by a man who turned out to be
a drug dealer.'" The jury's verdict of guilty contained implicit find-
ings that the defendant knew that 1) the buyer of the home was a
drug dealer and that 2) the funds used in the purchase were the
profits of illegal drug activity Both findings, however, were based
11. See id. § 1957(f)(2) ("[T]he term 'criminally derived property' means any property
constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained from a criminal offense ") (emphasis
added); H.R. REP. No. 855, supra note 8, at 14 (observations of Rep. McCollum) (declaring
that § 1957 applies to funds obtained from "peddling drugs"); see also United States v.
Johnson, 971 F.2d 562, 568 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that the Money Laundering Control Act
appears to have been aimed at "profits of drug activity"); cf. Russello v. United States, 464
U.S. 16, 20-21 (1983) (determining that a RICO provision calling for forfeiture of "any inter-
est acquired in violation of section 1962," 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1), applies to "profits
and proceeds" received as a result of RICO activity).
12. 777 F Supp. 1259 (W.D.N.C. 1991), rev'd in part, 977 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 122 L. Ed. 2d 716 (1993).
13. Id. at 1260-62.
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primarily on evidence that the buyer "looked and acted" like a
criminal: the buyer "drove a red Porsche , owned an expensive
new motor boat , carried a portable cellular phone
flashed $20,000 in cash , [and] drank beer away from his place
of business during the business day "14 As will be shown in this
Article, although this evidence may have established beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the real estate agent suspected that criminally
derived property was involved, it did not establish that she knew
that criminally derived property was involved.
Although the jury's verdict in Campbell ultimately was va-
cated, 5 the case demonstrates that verdicts of guilty under sec-
tion 1957 based on questionable levels of evidence are more than
just a hypothetical possibility- section 1957 poses a very real dan-
ger to bankers, merchants, and other persons whose businesses re-
quire them to handle funds of members of the public. Any banker,
merchant, or other businessperson who accepts funds from a cus-
tomer or client who arguably "looks and acts" like a professional
criminal, or who arguably is "reputed" to be a professional crimi-
nal, does so at some risk of a felony conviction and lengthy prison
term if it later turns out that the funds were indeed property de-
rived from crime. As this Article will show, unrestrained applica-
tion of section 1957 could not only lead to the conviction of inno-
cent persons-those whom Congress did not intend to brand as
criminals-it could result, in the words of one commentator, in the
transformation of persons merely suspected of criminal activity
"into commercial pariahs that bankers and businessmen will
shun." 6
The purpose of this Article is to examine section 1957 and sug-
gest ways to minimize its possible abusive application. Part II pro-
vides general background information concerning section 1957's
14. Id. at 1265.
15. The trial judge concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict
and entered judgment of acquittal, id. at 1264, but the Fourth Circuit reversed. United
States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 122 L. Ed. 2d 716 (1993). In
so holding, the court of appeals focused on the irregularity of the transaction and on evi-
dence that Campbell stated to an acquaintance that the funds involved "may have been
drug money." Id. at 859. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's conditional grant of
a new trial. Id. at 860. The Campbell case is discussed more fully infra part IV.B.
16. G. Richard Strafer, Money Laundering: The Crime of the '90's, 27 AM. Caim. L. REV.
149, 171 (1989).
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history, purpose, and potential applications, as well as the differ-
ences between section 1957 and its companion statute, sec-
tion 1956. Part III outlines the elements of section 1957, identifies
potential interpretive problems raised by the statute's wording,
and suggests jury instructions to reduce the possibility of convic-
tions based entirely on conduct that, although within sec-
tion 1957's literal terms, was not meant by Congress to be
criminalized. Part IV analyzes several constitutional issues raised
by section 1957 The Article concludes that section 1957 is not un-
constitutionally vague and, when properly construed, is not facially
invalid under the First Amendment's overbreadth, doctrine.
Nonetheless, to ensure that section 1957 does not encroach upon
constitutionally protected associational rights, jury instructions
must emphasize that the jury is required to acquit the defendant
unless the evidence affirmatively establishes, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the defendant knew that the transaction at issue in-
volved criminally derived property Juries must be instructed that
guilty verdicts may not be based on evidence that the defendant
merely suspected that criminally derived property was involved,
nor may guilty verdicts be based merely on evidence that the
source of the property at issue "appeared" or was "reputed to be"
a criminal. Indeed, juries must be instructed that a conviction may
not be based merely on evidence that the source of the property
was a criminal. In addition, and importantly, the courts must care-
fully review verdicts of guilty under section 1957 to ensure that
juries have in fact complied with these instructions.
Finally, the Article concludes that a 1988 amendment to sec-
tion 1957 exempting "transaction[s] necessary to preserve a per-
son's right to representation as guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment to the Constitution' 7 should be replaced with more precise
language specifying the extent to which the receipt of bona fide
attorneys' fees is exempt from liability under the statute. Statutory
incorporation of current Justice Department prosecution stan-
dards, if extended to include fees received for legal representation
in a civil matter, should accomplish this objective.
17. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(1) (1988)).
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II. BACKGROUND OF SECTION 1957
In 1984, the President's Commission on Organized Crime re-
leased an interim report, The Cash Connection: Organized
Crime, Financial Institutions, and Money Laundering.' The in-
terim report described the dramatic growth of money laundering,
the connection of money laundering to organized crime, and the
inability of existing statutes and regulations to address the prob-
lem adequately 19 It then proposed several administrative and leg-
islative changes, as well as voluntary guidelines for financial insti-
tutions, that the Commission believed would aid the government
in its war against money laundering.20 In response to the interim
report and other suggestions, Congress enacted the Money Laun-
d6ring Control Act of 1986.21 Among other things, the Act
strengthened the Bank Secrecy Act's currency reporting require-
ments,22 created a new antistructuring offense,23 granted broader
investigative powers to federal agencies, 24 created the new substan-
tive money laundering offenses codified at section 1956,25 and cre-
ated the new criminally derived property offense codified at
section 1957 26
Before the enactment of the Money Laundering Control Act,
criminal liability could be imposed on an individual for engaging in
money laundering activity only through indirect means. These in-
direct means consisted of imposing criminal liability on the money
launderer for: 1) conspiring to engage in the criminal activity that
generated the illegitimate funds; 2) violating or conspiring to com-
mit criminal activity in violation of the Travel Act;27 and 3) violat-
ing or conspiring to violate the currency transaction reporting pro-
18. CASH CONNECTION, supra note 2.
19. Id. at 58-82.
20. Id.
21. Pub. L. No. 99-570, tit. I, subtit. H, §§ 1351-1366, 100 Stat. 3207-18 (codified in part
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)).
22. Id. § 1354, 100 Stat. at 3207-22 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313, 5324 (1988)).
23. Id.
24. Id. § 1355, 100 Stat. at 3207-22 to -23 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5316).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (1988).
27. Id. § 1952.
1298 [Vol. 34:1291
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visions of the Bank Secrecy Act. 28 None of these measures proved
entirely adequate and, consequently, section 1956 was enacted to
criminalize money laundering activity directly Section 1956 de-
fines and prohibits three separate money laundering offenses. The
first is the "financial transaction" money laundering offense and is
defined and prohibited at subsection (a)(1); it applies to financial
transactions or attempted financial transactions involving proceeds
of unlawful activity 29 The second offense is the "extraterritorial
transportation" money laundering offense and is defined and pro-
hibited at subsection (a)(2); it applies to the extraterritorial trans-
portation or attempted extraterritorial transportation of monetary
instruments or funds involving, or represented to be, proceeds of
28. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5324. For a comprehensive discussion of government efforts to pros-
ecute money laundering activity prior to the enactment of the Money Laundering Control
Act of 1986, see Strafer, supra note 16, at 150-57. As the Strafer article points out, the chief
obstacle facing the government's attempts to impose conspiracy liability on a suspected
money launderer was the principle established in United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579 (2d
Cir.), aff'd, 311 U.S. 205 (1940), and Direct Sales v. United States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943).
Strafer, supra note 16, at 150-51. Those two cases established that a businessperson does
not become a member of a conspiracy to engage in illegal activity simply by providing ordi-
nary, legitimate goods or services to the perpetrator of the illegal activity, even if the busi-
nessperson does so with knowledge that the goods or services will be used to facilitate the
illegal activity. Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 713; Falcone, 109 F.2d at 581. The businessperson
also must provide the goods or services with intent to "further, promote, and cooperate in"
the illegal enterprise. Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 711. As a result of this principle, in virtually
every reported case upholding the conviction of a money launderer for conspiring to engage
in the illegal activity that generated illegitimate funds, the money launderer was an active
participant in the illegal enterprise itself. Strafer, supra note 16, at 153-57 (citing cases).
One of the few cases inconsistent with this view is United States v. Loften, 518 F Supp. 839
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). The court denied a motion to dismiss a RICO conspiracy indictment of an
attorney charged with knowingly assisting his client in the investment of illegitimate funds,
even though the attorney was not charged with engaging in the activity that generated the
funds. Id. at 844; see Strafer, supra note 16, at 156-57.
Because the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, criminalizes inter alia the intention to "facili-
tate" an ongoing, continuous illegal business enterprise, government efforts to prosecute
money launderers under the Travel Act have been somewhat more successful. Strafer, supra
note 16, at 154-55. Nonetheless, Travel Act prosecutions of money launderers is limited to
"individuals who knowing[ly] distribute and launder proceeds of an unlawful activity as
defined in [18 U.S.C.] section 1952(b)." United States v. Lignarolo, 770 F.2d 971, 978 n.11
(11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1105 (1986), quoted in Strafer, supra note 16, at 155.
For a discussion of problems incurred by the government in prosecuting suspected money
launderers for violating or conspiring to violate the provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act, see
infra part III.A.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1).
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unlawful activity 30 To commit either of the first two section 1956
offenses, an individual must: 1) know that proceeds of unlawful ac-
tivity are involved in the transaction or transportation at issue and
2) either a) intend to promote specified unlawful activity,
b) know that the transaction or transportation at issue is designed
to conceal or disguise the monetary instruments or funds involved,
or c) know that the purpose of the transaction or transportation is
to avoid a state or federal transaction reporting requirement.3 1 The
third money laundering offense under section 1956 is a "financial
transaction sting offense" and is defined and prohibited at subsec-
tion (a)(3). It was added by amendment in 19882 and imposes lia-
bility for engaging in financial transaction money laundering of-
fenses even when the property involved is "property represented
by law enforcement officers to be the proceeds of specified unlaw-
ful activity, or property used to conduct or facilitate specified un-
lawful activity ,,33 The property need not be the actual proceeds of
unlawful activity The purpose of this offense is to provide federal
authorities with the ability to use government money during un-
dercover sting operations to achieve convictions under the financial
transaction prong of section 1956 .3 A conviction under any provi-
30. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). The lone exception is the offense de-
fined and prohibited at subsection (a)(2)(A) of § 1956, which criminalizes the extraterrito-
rial movement or attempted movement of monetary instruments or funds "with the intent
to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity." Id. § 1956(a)(2)(A). By its terms,
subsection (a)(2)(A) applies to both illegitimate and legitimate funds (even when not repre-
sented to be illegitimate).
31. Id. § 1956(a)(1)-(2). With respect to the financial transaction offense only, this final
element also can be established by showing that the defendant engaged or attempted to
engage in a financial transaction "with intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation
of section 7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986." Id. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii).
Neither the extraterritorial movement offense, § 1956(a)(2), nor the financial transaction
sting offense, § 1956(a)(3), contains any similar tax evasion money laundering provision.
32. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a)(3) (1988).
34. The legislative history of subsection (a)(3) of § 1956 provides:
This amendment would permit undercover enforcement officers to pose as
drug traffickers in order to obtain evidence necessary to convict money laun-
derers. The present statute does not provide for such operations because it
permits a conviction only when the laundered money "in fact involves the pro-
ceeds of specified unlawful activity," 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1). Since money pro-
vided by an undercover officer posing as a drug trafficker does not "in fact"
involve drug money, the laundering of such money is not presently an offense
under the statute.
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sion of section 1956 carries a maximum penalty of twenty years
imprisonment, criminal fines, and the forfeiture of all property in-
volved in or traceable to the offense. 5
The other new substantive criminal offense created by the
Money Laundering Control Act is the criminally derived property
offense defined and prohibited at section 1957 36 Both sections
1956 and 1957 apply only to transactions that involve funds or
property generated by criminal activity or, with respect to sec-
tion 1956, funds represented to be the proceeds of crime.37 The
two statutes differ, however, in two key respects. First, sec-
tion 1956 contains no minimum value threshold, while sec-
tion 1957 applies only to transactions involving tainted property of
value greater than $10,000.38 Second, section 1956 generally ap-
plies only to transactions that are in some way designed to further
unlawful activity or conceal or disguise the proceeds of unlawful
activity,39 an element not present in section 1957 Thus, unlike
section 1956, section 1957 criminalizes certain conduct not neces-
sarily related to an effort to launder money
This latter distinction was highlighted recently by the Tenth
Circuit in United States v. Sanders.4" In that case, a drug dealer
was convicted after a jury trial on one count of violating sec-
tion 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) through the purchase of a Volvo automobile
and one count of violating section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) through the
purchase of a Lincoln automobile. 41 The defendant purchased both
automobiles at a commercial car dealership. 42 The evidence was
clear that the defendant had purchased the automobiles with pro-
ceeds from his unlawful drug activity; however, there was no evi-
134 CONG. REC. S14,072 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1988) (analysis of Sen. Nunn).
35. The maximum penalty for a violation of § 1956 is 20 years imprisonment, a fine of
$500,000 or twice the value of the property involved in the activity giving rise to conviction,
or both. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)-(3) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (1988).
37. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(c)-(e), 1957(a) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). The lone exception is the§ 1956(a)(2)(A) offense, which applies to both illegitimate and legitimate funds (even when
not represented to be illegitimate): See supra note 30.
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (1988).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
40. 928 F.2d 940 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 142 (1991).
41. Id. at 945.
42. Id. at 944-46.
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dence that the defendant's purpose in purchasing the Volvo was to
conceal or hide the tainted proceeds.43 He was simply enjoying his
ill-gotten gains. Similarly, the only evidence that the defendant's
purpose in purchasing the Lincoln was to conceal or hide the
tainted drug proceeds was that he titled the car in his daughter's
name and that his wife signed her daughter's name to the purchase
agreement. 4"
On appeal, the government argued that subsection (a)(1)(B)(i)
should be interpreted broadly to criminalize all commercial trans-
actions made with knowledge that proceeds of unlawful activity are
involved, regardless of whether the transactions are also designed
to conceal or disguise those proceeds.4 5 The court of appeals re-
jected the government's argument and reversed the convictions.46
Although the court noted that "the Lincoln purchase clearly
presents a closer case in favor of conviction than the Volvo
purchase,"4 the court concluded that the evidence was insufficient
to support either conviction.4" The court noted that, by its terms,
subsection (a)(1)(B)(i) applies to transactions " 'designed to con-
ceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership
or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity' "49
Therefore, the court concluded, the government's asserted inter-
pretation of section 1956 would conflict with Congress' express in-
tent and turn section 1956, a money laundering statute, into a
"money spending statute."50
Had the defendant in Sanders been prosecuted under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1957, the government may well have been able to support con-
victions for the purchase of each automobile. 51 Unlike sec-
tion 1956, section 1957 is indeed a "money spending statute" in
the sense that a criminal can violate it by simply knowingly spend-
ing more than $10,000 of ill-gotten gains, without any other unlaw-
43. Id. at 946.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 945-46.
46. Id. at 946.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 947.
49. Id. at 946 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (1988)).
50. Id.
51. Obviously, the government would have had to establish that each transaction involved
funds exceeding $10,000 in value. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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ful purpose. Section 1957 is also a "money receiving statute" in
the sense that the knowing receipt or other handling of more than
$10,000 of tainted'funds or property, without any other unlawful
purpose, can constitute a violation of the statute.52
Section 1957 is a money "laundering" statute only in the sense
that, uider some circumstances, it can be used by prosecutors to
attack money laundering activity indirectly One example would
be when prosecutors suspect that an individual has engaged in a
monetary transaction with the purpose of laundering money but
believe they lack sufficient evidence to prove such unlawful pur-
pose. If the prosecutors nonetheless believe the evidence is suffi-
cient to support a section 1957 conviction, they can still prosecute
the individual, albeit under section 1957 and not 1956, in an at-
tempt to put the suspected money launderer behind bars.
Another example along this line is when prosecutors believe they
have sufficient evidence to support a section 1956 conviction and
draft the indictment to include a count charging a violation of sec-
tion 1957 based on the same monetary transaction. Their purpose
in doing so simply is to reduce the defendant's chances of gaining
an outright acquittal at trial. As an illustration, suppose that fed-
eral prosecutors have information that an individual deposited
$20,000 in proceeds from specified unlawful activity in a bank with
knowledge that the funds were proceeds of unlawful activity The
prosecutors also have information that the individual did so with
knowledge that the purpose of the transaction was to conceal or
disguise the $20,000. The latter information-which if true changes
the nature of the transaction from one that might have been as-
sociated with money laundering activity to one that was money
laundering activity-leads the prosecutors to seek an indictment
with a count charging the suspect with a violation of section
1956(a) (1)(B) (i).
Because the suspect's conduct also constitutes a violation of sec-
tion 1957, the prosecutors seek an additional count charging the
suspect with a violation of that statute. Although the prosecutors'
main goal is to achieve a section 1956 conviction, the addition of
the section 1957 count will lessen the suspect's chances of gaining
an outright acquittal at trial. If at trial the prosecutors encounter
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a)-(c) (1988).
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difficulties meeting their burden of proof with respect to the last
element of a section 1956 offense (i.e., the defendant knew that
the purpose of the transaction was to conceal or disguise the
tainted funds)," they can still achieve a conviction, albeit under
section 1957 instead of section 1956.
Because prosecutions under section 1956 require proof that the
defendant knew that the purpose of the transaction was to commit
money laundering, prosecutors attempting to achieve a conviction
under that section will often face many of the same evidentiary
obstacles faced by prosecutors attempting to convict suspected
money launderers for conspiracy to engage in the illegal activity
that generated the illicit funds." In many cases, a conviction under
section 1956 will require proof of extensive communications be-
tween the suspected money launderer and the criminal or criminal
enterprise that generated the funds, as well as the nature of those
communications, in order to show that the suspected money laun-
derer realized that the criminal was not simply spending illicit
funds. Such evidence may not be available; section 1957 is availa-
ble as an alternative when it is not.55
53. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
55. An interesting question is whether, assuming the defendant in this hypothetical is
convicted under both the § 1956 and § 1957 counts, the double jeopardy clause would pro-
hibit the sentencing court from imposing cumulative punishments. Under Blockburger v.
United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), the double jeopardy clause prohibits the imposition of
multiple punishments if one of the offenses of conviction is a lesser-included offense of the
other, i.e., all of the elements of one of the offenses constitute elements of the other. Id. at
304. Under this standard, in the hypothetical, the imposition of cumulative punishments
would not be barred because one element of a § 1957 offense-the $10,000 threshold-is not
included within the § 1956 offense. However, the Blockburger test is simply a "rule of statu-
tory construction," a guide to determining whether the legislature intended multiple punish-
ments. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 517 (1990) (citation omitted). A strong argument
could be made that Congress did not intend the imposition of multiple punishments for
situations in which the defendant has been convicted of both a § 1956 offense and a § 1957
offense based on the same monetary transaction.
The double jeopardy clause, however, does not bar imposition of a punishment for com-
mitting a § 1957 violation and a separate punishment for committing the underlying offense
that gave rise to the criminally derived property forming the basis of the § 1957 offense.
United States v. Lovett, 964 F.2d 1029, 1041-43 (10th Cir.) (holding that double jeopardy
was not violated by the imposition of separate punishments for monetary transactions de-
rived from unlawful activity and for the unlawful activity), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 169
(1992); see also United States v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d 1206, 1212-14 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding
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III. THE ELEMENTS OF SECTION 1957, INTERPRETIVE PROBLEMS,
AND SUGGESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
A. The Elements
Subsection (a) of section 1957 reads in its entirety as follows:
"Whoever, in any of the circumstances set forth in subsection (d),
knowingly engages or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction
in criminally derived property that is of a value greater than
$10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity, shall be
pumshed as provided in subsection (b)."15 6 Subsection (a)'s refer-
ence to the "circumstances set forth in subsection (d)" merely pro-
vides for extraterritorial application of the statute." As discussed
below, the following constitutes the elements of a section 1957 of-
fense that the government should be required to include in charg-
ing instruments and prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial: 1)
the defendant knowingly engaged or attempted to engage in a
monetary transaction; 2) the defendant knew that the transaction
involved criminally derived property; 3) the value of the criminally
derived property involved in the transaction exceeded $10,000; and
4) the property involved in the transaction was derived from speci-
fied unlawful activity 58
1. The Defendant Knowingly Engaged or Attempted to
Engage in a Monetary Transaction
The first element of a section 1957 offense is readily discernable
from the statute's language. The statute defines "monetary trans-
action" as "the deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or exchange, in or af-
that conviction for both conversion and money laundering did not violate the double jeop-
ardy clause), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3037 (1992).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (1988).
57. Subsection (d) of § 1957 provides:
The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) are-
(1) that the offense under this section takes place in the United States or in
the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States; or
(2) that the offense under this section takes place outside the United States
and such special jurisdiction, but the defendant is a United States person (as
defined in section 3077 of this title, but excluding the class described in para-
graph (2)(D) of such section).
Id. § 1957(d).
58. See id. § 1957(a).
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fecting interstate or foreign commerce, of funds or a monetary in-
strument by, through, or to a financial institution (as defined
in section 5312 of title 31)."" 9 By thus incorporating the broad def-
inition of "financial institution" found in 31 U.S.C. § 5312, the ex-
change of funds or monetary instruments in a vast array of com-
mercial settings will qualify as "monetary transactions" under
section 1957 60
59. Id. § 1957(f)(1). The statute further provides that the term "monetary transaction"
"does not include any transaction necessary to preserve a person's right to representation as
guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the Constitution." Id. The inclusion of this language
is discussed infra part IV.C.
The term "monetary instrument," as used in § 1956 and § 1957, is much broader than
the term "monetary instrument" as currently defined in the regulations implementing the
Bank Secrecy Act. Personal checks, bank checks, and money orders are "monetary instru-
ments" under § 1956 and § 1957 regardless of whether they are in bearer form or otherwise.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(c)(5), 1957(f)(1) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). In contrast, personal checks,
bank checks, and money orders are "monetary instruments" under the Bank Secrecy Act
only if "in bearer form, endorsed without restriction, made out to a fictitious payee or
otherwise in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery." 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(m)(iii)
(1992).
60. Section 1957 incorporates the Bank Secrecy Act's definition of "financial institution"
by reference. Id. The Bank Secrecy Act defines "financial institution" as:
(A) an insured bank (as defined in section 3(h) of the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(h)));
(B) a commercial bank or trust company;
(C) a private banker;
(D) an agency or branch of a foreign bank in the United States;
(E) an insured institution (as defined in section 401(a) of the National
Housing Act (12 U.S.C. 1724(a)));
(F) a thrift institution;
(G) a broker or dealer registered with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.);
(H) a broker or dealer in securities or commodities;
(I) an investment banker or investment company;
(J) a currency exchange;
(K) an issuer, redeemer, or cashier of travelers' checks, checks, money or-
ders, or similar instruments;
(L) an operator of a credit card system;
(M) an insurance company;
(N) a dealer in precious metals, stones, or jewels;
(0) a pawnbroker;
(P) a loan or finance company;
(Q) a travel agency;
(R) a licensed sender of money;
(S) a telegraph company;
(T) a business engaged in vehicle sales, including automobile, airplane, and
boat sales;
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One question is whether the "in or affecting interstate com-
merce" requirement of section 1957 is an element of the offense
that the government must allege in charging instruments and
prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. Language from one
court's opinion arguably suggests that it is not. In United States v.
Kelley,e1 the Tenth Circuit upheld a section 1957 conviction
against the claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the
jury's finding that the monetary transaction at issue was one "in or
affecting interstate commerce." 2 In upholding the conviction, the
court reasoned that the government need only show a "minimal
effect" on interstate commerce, and that it had met that burden. 3
The court stated that section 1957's "requirement that the trans-
action be 'in or affecting interstate commerce' must be met in or-
der to confer jurisdiction on federal courts. Such, however, is not
an essential element of the crime charged. '64
Because the precise issue before the court in Kelley was the suf-
ficiency of the evidence, not the validity of the charging instru-
ment or the propriety of the jury instructions, the court's opinion
should be considered dicta to the extent it suggests that the inter-
state commerce requirement of section 1957 is not an element of
the offense that must be included in charging instruments and jury
instructions. In any event, such a conclusion conflicts with well-
established precedent that the interstate commerce ingredients of
"affecting commerce" federal criminal statutes normally are ele-
ments that must be included in charging instruments and proved
(U) persons involved in real estate closings and settlements;
(V) the United States Postal Service;
(W) an agency of the United States Government or of a State or local gov-
ernment carrying out a duty or power of a business described in this
paragraph;
(X) any business or agency which engages in any activity which the Secre-
tary of the Treasury determines, by regulation, to be an activity which is simi-
lar to, related to, or a substitute for any activity in which any business de-
scribed in this paragraph is authorized to engage; or
(Y) any other business designated by the Secretary whose cash transactions
have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory matters.
31 U.S.C. § 5312(2) (1988).
61. 929 F.2d 582 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 341 (1991).
62. Id. at 585-86.
63. Id. at 586.
64. Id. (emphasis added).
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beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. Although the government need
only prove a minimal nexus to interstate commerce 5 and need not
prove that the defendant knew that an interstate commerce con-
nection existed,66 it must prove, to the trier-of-fact's satisfaction,
the existence of a minimal connection beyond a reasonable doubt.6
Kelley is indeed correct to the extent it suggests that the "inter-
state commerce" language in section 1957 is a jurisdictional re-
quirement and, as such, the court-in addition to the jury-must
be satisfied that the requisite interstate commerce connection ex-
ists. The "interstate commerce" language in section 1957 is un-
doubtedly nothing more than the typical boilerplate Congress nor-
mally includes, in an excess of caution, to remove any doubts
concerning its constitutional power to regulate in the area in ques-
tion.' However, because Congress chose to impose this "jurisdic-
65. United States v. Lovett, 964 F.2d 1029, 1038-39 (10th Cir.) (holding that the prosecu-
tion must show a nexus, albeit minimal, to interstate commerce to support a § 1957 convic-
tion), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 169 (1992).
66. United States v. Pranno, 385 F.2d 387, 389-90 (7th Cir. 1967) (regarding the Hobbs
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 944 (1968).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971). Bass concerned a felon's chal-
lenge to a conviction for the possession of two firearms. Id. at 337. The relevant statute
provided in pertinent part: "[It is a criminal offense for a convicted felon to] receiv[e], pos-
sess[ 1, or transport[ ] in commerce or affecting commerce any firearm " 18 U.S.C. app.
§ 1202(a) (1968) (emphasis added). The government did not allege in the indictment, and
did not attempt to prove at trial, that the firearms at issue had been possessed "in com-
merce or affecting commerce." Bass, 404 U.S. at 338. The Supreme Court held that these
failures required setting the convictions aside because "ambiguity concerning the ambit of
criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity," and "unless Congress conveys its
purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state bal-
ance." Id. at 347-49 (citations omitted). Although the Court did not precisely hold that the
interstate commerce nexus must be proven to the jury's satisfaction (as opposed to just the
trial court's satisfaction), the Court's emphasis on the procedural posture of the case (the
government's failure to allege the requisite nexus "in the indictment" and prove the requi-
site nexus "at trial"), as well as the "ambit" of the criminal statute, strongly suggest that
the interstate commerce nexus must be proven to the jury's satisfaction. See id. at 339-43;
see also United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 573 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding that in a prosecu-
tion for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962, the jury need only be instructed that the govern-
ment must show a nexus, albeit minimal, to interstate commerce), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946
(1980).
68. "Affecting commerce" statutes should be distinguished from "class of activity" stat-
utes. Under a properly enacted "class of activity" statute, the government need not allege
and prove an interstate commerce connection in an individual prosecution so long as the
conduct subject to the prosecution is within a class of activity that affects commerce. Perez
v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151-52 (1971). The constitutionality of "class of activity"
federal criminal statutes was upheld in Perez, which concerned a prosecution for loan-shark-
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tional" limitation in a manner that also restricts the substantive
scope of the statute, due process requires that the government also
must prove the interstate commerce connection to the jury's satis-
faction beyond a reasonable doubt-not as a jurisdictional require-
ment, but as a substantive element of the offense. In short, the
"interstate commerce" requirement is both jurisdictional and sub-
stantive: the government must prove the interstate commerce con-
nection to the satisfaction of both decisionmakers6 9
Consequently, federal prosecutors would be well advised to con-
tinue drafting section 1957 indictments and jury instructions in a
manner that makes it clear that the interstate commerce require-
ment is an "element" of the offense.70 As a practical matter, doing
so would rarely result in an acquittal solely on that point; failure to
do so, however, could result in the reversal of an otherwise prop-
erly obtained conviction.
ing under Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 82 Stat. 159 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (1988)). Nonetheless, with the notable exceptions of the enactment
of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513,
84 Stat. 1242 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-969 (1988)), and the illegal gambling
business provision, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 937 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1955), Congress rarely has chosen the class of activity approach when enacting criminal
statutes. Congress' continued preference for "affecting commerce" statutes may be partially
explained by Perez's emphasis, in concluding that loan-sharking is a "class of activity" af-
fecting interstate commerce, on the close connection of loan-sharking to organized crime, an
activity that inherently affects interstate commerce. Perez, 402 U.S. at 155-57. This empha-
sis leaves some doubt as to the full extent of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause
to criminalize traditional state crimes under the "class of activity" approach.
69. It is not suggested here, however, that a district court must explicitly state on the
record that it has independently found the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. A court's
entry of judgment of guilt in accordance with the jury verdict normally would implicitly
manifest that the court had independently examined the evidence, without deference to any
credibility determinations by the jury, and had concluded that the requisite interstate com-
merce connection existed (thus conferring jurisdiction on the court), and that the jury's
finding that the necessary interstate commerce connection existed was based on sufficient
evidence (assuming that the defense had made a timely motion for judgment of acquittal at
the close of trial).
70. One straightforward, unambiguous method of doing this would be to set out the ele-
ments of the offense as suggested in this Article and then provide the grand jury or petit
jury with the definition of "monetary transaction" set out in 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(1).
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2. The Defendant Knew the Transactin Involved Crminally
Derwed Property
The key element of section 1957 is its requirement that the de-
fendant must know that the transaction involves criminally de-
rived property 71 Unfortunately, the grammatical structure of sub-
section (a) is somewhat ambiguous with respect to this element.
The ambiguity arises from the position of the word "knowingly"; it
is unclear whether it modifies the phrase "in criminally derived
property," or just the phrase "engaging or attempting to engage in
a monetary transaction." 2 The legislative history of section 1957,
however, leaves no doubt that Congress intended to criminalize
only those transactions made with knowledge that criminally de-
rived property is involved.7 Furthermore, subsection (f)(2) defines
"criminally derived property" as "property constituting, or derived
from, proceeds obtained from a criminal offense. '74 Because sub-
section (c) provides that "the [g]overnment is not required to
prove that the defendant knew that the offense from which the
criminally derived property was derived was specified unlawful ac-
tivlty," 7 5 Congress' failure to state specifically that the government
also need not prove that the defendant knew that the funds in-
volved were proceeds of any form of criminal activity raises a
strong presumption, by negative implication, that Congress in-
tended that the government must affirmatively prove that the de-
fendant knew that the monetary transaction at issue involved
criminally derived property 76
71. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a).
72. See id.
73. H.R. REP. No. 855, supra note 8, at 13-14.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(2).
75. Id. § 1957(c).
76. See United States v. Krenning, No. 91-514 § N, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11283, at *11
(E.D. La. July 17, 1992) (holding that the plain meaning of § 1957 "does not restrict the
application of the term 'knowingly' to 'monetary transaction' but rather applies it to all the
elements except those specifically excluded by the statute") (citing United States v. Baker,
No. 89-83-CR-T-15B (M.D. Fla. July 28, 1989)). The rule of lenity also suggests this con-
struction: "The [Supreme] Court has often stated that when there are two rational readings
of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, we are to choose the harsher only when
Congress has spoken in clear and definite language." McNally v. United States, 483 U.S.
350, 359-60 (1987) (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971); Rewis v. United
States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971); United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218,
221-22 (1952)).
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a. The Problem of "Tracking" the Language of the Statute
Because the grammatical structure of subsection (a) of sec-
tion 1957 is ambiguous with respect to the knowledge element, the
first two elements of a section 1957 offense should not be merged
in charging instruments and jury instructions by simply "tracking"
the language of the statute. In other words, charging instruments
should not simply state that "the defendant knowingly engaged or
attempted to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally de-
rived property," nor should petit juries be instructed, without
more, that such conduct is an element of the offense. Doing so runs
the risk that the defendant will be charged or convicted on the
mistaken belief that a section 1957 offense can be committed with-
out knowledge that criminally derived property was involved in the
transaction at issue. Grand and petit juries must make their deci-
sions without access to legislative history or rules of statutory con-
struction. Separation into two elements, as previously indicated,
eliminates this ambiguity
b. Knowledge of "Criminally Derived Property" Are
Misdemeanors Included?
The term "criminally derived property" is defined in subsec-
tion (f)(2) of section 1957 as "any property constituting, or de-
rived from, proceeds obtained from a criminal offense."'7 The term
"criminal offense" is not defined in section 1957, but subsec-
tion (c) provides: "In a prosecution for an offense under this sec-
tion, the Government is not required to prove that the defendant
knew that the offense from which the criminally derived property
was derived was specified unlawful activity ,,"8 Although this lan-
guage is clear as to what the government need not prove, it leaves
unclear what the government must prove. It certainly means that
the government may meet its burden of proof by showing that the
defendant believed that the criminally derived property at issue
was derived from any felony, not necessarily one of the felonies
77. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(0(2).
78. Id. § 1957(c).
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listed as "specified unlawful activity" in section 1956 (which ap-
plies to section 1957 by cross-reference).79
The Department of Justice Manual, however, takes the position
that the government can also meet its burden by proving that the
defendant believed that the funds at issue were derived from a
misdemeanor.8 0 This contention should be rejected. The legislative
history of section 1957 is inconclusive on this point,"' but the lan-
guage and legislative history of section 1956 provide valuable guid-
ance. Subsection (c)(1) of section 1956 states:
[T]he term "knowing that the property involved in a financial
transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful ac-
tivity" means that the person knew the property involved in the
transaction represented proceeds from some form, though not
necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a felony
under State, Federal, or foreign law, regardless of whether or not
such activity is [specified unlawful activity].2
Senate Report 433, the principal legislative document accompany-
ing section 1956, explains the purpose of this provision in the fol-
lowing passage:
This distinction is drawn in order to prevent a defendant from
escaping conviction by merely alleging that he or she thought
the property involved represented the proceeds of a crime not
covered in the term "specified unlawful activity." It was re-
ported to the Committee that such a defense has been success-
fully raised in other countries whose statutes do not draw the
distinction drawn in this section and it is the Committee's inten-
tion to avoid that result.
79. Id. § 1957(f)(3).
80. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, § 9-105.400.
81. The only relevant legislative history on this point is the following inconclusive
passage:
[Tihe government need not prove that the defendant knew that the offense
from which the criminally derived property was derived was a designated of-
fense The government must prove, however, that the defendant knew
that the subject matter of the transaction was derived from some crime, and it
must prove that the subject matter of the transaction was derived from a des-
ignated offense.
H.R. REP. No. 855, supra note 8, at 16.
82. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. II 1990) (emphasis added).
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As explained above, the significance of this phrase is that
the defendant need not know exactly what crime generated the
funds involved in a transaction, only that the funds are the pro-
ceeds of some kind of crime that is a felony under Federal or
State law. This will eviscerate the defense that a defendant
knew the funds came from a crime, but thought the crime in-
volved was a crime not on the list of [specified unlawful
activity.]"3
The clear implication of both the language and legislative his-
tory of section 1956 is that Congress' purpose in lowering the gov-
ernment's burden of proof in prosecutions under that statute was
to relieve the government of having to prove that the defendant
believed that the felony involved was one of those listed as speci-
fied unlawful activity, not to relieve it of having to prove that the
defendant believed that any felony at all was involved. The gap
Congress left in section 1957 should be filled by reference to the
approach it took with respect to section 1957's companion statute,
absent any other indication from Congress concerning how the
statute should be interpreted. 4
c. After-Acquired Knowledge
To commit an offense under section 1957, one must be aware of
the illicit nature of the property involved at the time the monetary
transaction occurs.8 5 Thus, a person who engages or attempts to
engage in a monetary transaction involving criminally derived
property, without knowledge that the transaction involves crimi-
nally derived property, has not violated section 1957 even if he or
she gains such knowledge after the transaction is completed. After-
acquired knowledge, however, can satisfy the statute's scienter ele-
ment with respect to further monetary transactions that are en-
gaged in with the same tainted funds. For example, an automobile
83. S. REP. No. 433, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1986) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 433].
84. See District of Columbia v. Orleans, 406 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (finding that the
meaning of undefined statutory words may be ascertained by looking to the definition of
such words in other relevant statutes); United States ex rel. McCoy v. California Medical
Review, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 143 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (stating that when a statutory term is not
defined in the statute or its legislative history, courts may look for guidance to other rele-
vant statutes or other authority where the term has been defined).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (1988).
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dealer who receives $30,000 from the sale of an automobile without
knowledge that the funds are criminally derived property has not
thereby committed a section 1957 offense. If, however, the dealer
subsequently learns that the proceeds from the sale are criminally
derived property and then deposits the $30,000 into a bank ac-
count, the dealer's conduct would normally constitute a violation
of the statute.86
d. Actual Knowledge, Willful Blindness, and
Subjective Intent
Section 1957 requires proof of "knowledge" on the part of the
defendant; Congress expressly rejected law enforcement calls for
lesser "reason to know" or "reckless disregard" scienter stan-
dards.8 7 Normally, this means that the defendant must have had
"actual" or "positive" knowledge that criminally derived property
was involved in the monetary transaction at issue.' In numerous
analogous contexts, however, the courts have held that the govern-
ment may also satisfy the knowledge requirement of a criminal
statute by showing that the defendant acted with "willful blind-
ness." 9 The legislative history of the Money Laundering Control
Act supports the view that Congress was aware of judicial recogni-
tion of the willful-blindness standard and fully endorsed its use in
prosecutions under section 1957 Although section 1957's legisla-
tive history does not refer to the willful-blindness standard, Senate
Report 433, the principal legislative document accompanying sec-
tion 1956, does. 0
One of the "knowing" scienter elements of section 1956 referred
to in Senate Report 433 is knowledge that the funds involved are
86. See infra part II.B.
87. Congress' rejection of "reason to know" and "reckless disregard" standards came in
response to testimony by representatives of the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, the American Civil Liberties Union, and other groups that vigorously opposed use
of these standards as a substitute for actual knowledge. S. REP. No. 433, supra note 83, at
6-7.
88. United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
951 (1976).
89. Id. at 704.
90. S. REP. No. 433, supra note 83, at 9-10 (citing Jewell, 532 F.2d at 697) ("The [two]
'knowing' scienter requirements [of section 1956] are intended to be construed, like existing
'knowing' scienter requirements, to include instances of 'willful blindness' ").
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tainted-the same scienter element in section 1957 91 Senate Re-
port 433, therefore, strongly suggests that Congress intended that
in appropriate cases the government also may satisfy its burden of
proof in section 1957 cases through use of the willful-blindness
standard.
The endorsement of the willful-blindness standard for prosecu-
tions under sections 1956 and 1957 has been criticized as indi-
rectly lessening the scienter requirement to the same extent that
adoption of reason-to-know or reckless-disregard standards would
have done directly 92 In this author's view, this is true only to the
extent that the willful-blindness standard is articulated incor-
rectly Both the reason-to-know and reckless-disregard standards
have objective components such that a defendant's claim of subjec-
tive ignorance cannot entirely defend against them."3 In contrast,
91. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (1988) with zd. § 1956(a).
92. E.g., Strafer, supra note 16, at 166.
93. The rejected reason-to-know standard corresponds to the following definition of "neg-
ligently" in the Model Penal Code:
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense
when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the mate-
rial element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature
and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a
gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would ob-
serve in the actor's situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (1974) (emphasis added). The rejected reckless-disregard
standard corresponds to the following definition of "recklessly" in the Code:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense
when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the ac-
tor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would
observe in the actor's situation.
Id. § 2.02(2)(c) (emphasis added).
Although the Code's negligence standard is entirely objective, its recklessness standard is
part subjective and part objective. The "consciously disregards" language of § 2.02(2)(c)
plainly means that to act recklessly, the actor must subjectively realize that some risk is
involved. However, the actor need not subjectively realize that the degree of risk involved
is "substantial and unjustifiable." Id. So long as the risk is "a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situa-
tion"--evaluated from an objective standard-the actor's conduct is reckless. In Robinson v.
Commonwealth, 569 S.W.2d 183 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978), the court stated that when
gravamen of the offense is the failure to perceive a substantial and unjus-
tifi[able] risk [and] such failure is a gross deviation from the standard of care
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such a claim can defend entirely against the willful-blindness stan-
dard, if properly articulated. United States v. Jewell,9 4 to which
Senate Report 433 refers, quotes the Model Penal Code definition
of "willful blindness" " 'When knowledge of the existence of a
particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is es-
tablished if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence,
unless he actually believes it does not exist.' "9 This means that a
jury in a section 1956 or 1957 prosecution may not convict under
the willful-blindness standard unless it finds beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant subjectively believed that there was a
high probability that the monetary transaction at issue involved
tainted funds. The jury may not convict merely because a reasona-
ble person in the defendant's shoes would have believed that there
was a high probability that the monetary transaction involved
tainted funds9e
In answering the willful-blindness question, of course, the trier-
of-fact may draw appropriate inferences from objective circum-
that a reasonable person would observe in the situation[, there is no] require-
ment [that the state] show a subjective realization on the part of the actor that
his conduct create[d] a substantial risk.
Id. at 185; see also Commonwealth v. Polimem, 378 A.2d 1189, 1195 (Pa. 1977) (finding that
recklessness for involuntary manslaughter purposes means that " '[t]he negligence must be
such a departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinary prudent or careful man
under the circumstances as to evidence a disregard of human life or an indifference to con-
sequences'" (emphasis added) (quoting Commonwealth v. Aurick, 19 A.2d 920, 923 (Pa.
1941)). The court in Polimern noted with approval Justice Robert's conclusion that the
Model Penal Code's definition of recklessness, which Pennsylvania adopted in 1972, is sub-
stantially the same as the definition of recklessness under prior Pennsylvania law. Id. n.17
(citing Commonwealth v. Moore, 344 A.2d 850, 857 (Pa. 1975) (Roberts, J., concurring)).
Justice Roberts articulated the definition of involuntary manslaughter: "One is guilty of
involuntary manslaughter if, in killing another, he either consciously disregarded or, grossly
deviating from a standard of reasonable care, failed to perceive a substantial and unjustifi-
able risk that his actions might cause death or serious bodily harm to another." Moore, 344
A.2d at 857 (Roberts, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
94. 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976).
95. Id. at 700-01 (emphasis added) (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 202(7) (Prop. Official
Draft, 1962)).
In Jewell the court noted that the Model Penal Code definition of willful blindness had
been approved by the Supreme Court in a number of contexts. Id. (citing Barnes v. United
States, 412 U.S. 837, 845 & n.10 (1973) (approving a willful-blindness instruction in a prose-
cution under 18 U.S.C. § 1708); Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 416 & n.29 (1970)
(21 U.S.C. § 174); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 46 n.93 (1969) (21 U.S.C. § 176a)).
96. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d).
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stances. 97 In this regard, Congress' endorsement of the willful-
blindness standard in Senate Report 433 is immediately followed
by two examples of how the standard would apply in hypothetical
cases:
Thus, a currency exchanger who participates in a transaction
with a known drug dealer involving hundreds of thousands of
dollars m cash and accepts a commission far above the market
rate, could not escape conviction, from the first tier of the of-
fense, simply by claiming that he did not know for sure that the
currency involved in the transaction was derived from crime. On
the other hand, an automobile car dealer who sells a car at mar-
ket rates to a person whom he merely suspects of involvement
with crime, cannot be convicted of this offense in the absence of
a showing that he knew something more about the transaction
or the circumstances surrounding it.98
Both of these examples are instructive concerning the quantum of
evidence necessary to support a jury's verdict of guilty under the
willful-blindness standard in a section 1956 or section 1957 prose-
cution: both emphasize that a jury's verdict of guilty may not be
sustained if the evidence supports only a finding that the defend-
ant suspected that criminally derived property was involved in the
monetary transaction at issue. The currency-exchanger example,
however, is misleading to the extent it suggests that, under the
willful-blindness standard, juries may be instructed that the exis-
tence of certain objective facts, such as those outlined in the auto-
mobile-dealer example, raises an irrebuttable presumption of guilt
under section 1957-a presumption that cannot be overcome even
if, notwithstanding these objective facts, the jury is not convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was willfully blind
to the fact that the transaction involved criminally derived prop-
erty 99 It bears repeating that application of the willful-blindness
97. See County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979) (recognizing that inferences and
presumptions are a "staple of our adversary system of fact finding").
98. S. REP. No. 433, supra note 83, at 10.
99. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). At issue in Sandstrom was the valid-
ity of an instruction in a criminal trial that "[t]he law presumes that a person intends the
ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts." Id. at 513. The Court first concluded that this
instruction could have been interpreted by the jury as either a conclusive, irrebuttable pre-
sumption that required the jury to find crunminal intent once the underlying facts were trig-
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standard is a subjective inquiry; if the defendant did not subjec-
tively believe that there was a high probability that criminally de-
rived property was involved, the defendant must be found not
guilty regardless of how objectively unreasonable that belief might
have been.
Finally, Senate Report 433's reference to United States v. Jew-
ell has apparently led some courts in section 1956 and 1957 cases
to rely on variants of the "conscious purpose" willful-blindness
charge used by the trial court in that case:
"The Government can complete [its] burden of proof by prov-
ing, beyond a reasonable doubt, that if the defendant was not
actually aware [of the fact at issue] his ignorance in that regard
was solely and entirely a result of his having made a conscious
purpose to disregard [learning the fact at issue], with a con-
scious purpose to avoid learning the truth."00
gered, regardless of any evidence produced by the defendant to rebut the presumption, or a
nonconclusive presumption that required the jury to find criminal intent only if the under-
lying facts were proved and the defendant did not come forward with some quantum of
proof to the contrary. Id. at 517. The Court held that under either interpretation, the in-
struction at issue deprived the defendant of his due process right to conviction only upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 523-24.
Sandstrom clearly stands for the proposition that almost never will it be proper to in-
struct a jury that an irrebuttable presumption exists requiring the jury to find criminal
intent once certain objective facts are established. With respect to nonconclusive presump-
tions, however, the Sandstrom holding is not so broad. It appears that as a nonconclusive
presumption, the Sandstrom instruction was deficient because it required the jury to find
the existence of criminal intent once certain objective facts had been established unless the
defendant came forward with proof to the contrary. It therefore effectively shifted the bur-
den of persuasion (or at least the burden of production) to the defendant. In contrast, a
nonconclusive presumption that simply permits the jury to infer the existence of criminal
intent once certain objective facts have been established, but does not in any way shift the
burden of production or persuasion to the defendant, is still valid as long as it meets the
standards set forth in Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 841-43 (1973) (holding a per-
missive presumption valid if a rational juror could find the inferred fact from the proved
fact beyond a reasonable doubt and if the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from
the proved fact), and Allen, 442 U.S. at 165 (holding a permissive presumption valid unless
no rational basis exists for the trier-of-fact to make its connection from the permitted
evidence).
100. United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (quoting the trial
court's charge), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 951 (1976). For example, the trial court in United
States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 122 L. Ed. 2d 716 (1993),
instructed the jury as follows:
The element of knowledge may be satisfied by inferences drawn from proof
that a defendant deliberately closed her eyes to what would otherwise have
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However, both the majority and dissent in Jewell criticized use of
the "conscious purpose" instruction and recommended use of the
Model Penal Code version of the willful-blindness charge in-
stead. 1 ' Among other things, the conscious-purpose charge is am-
biguous, deemphasizes the subjective nature of the willful-blind-
ness inquiry, and misleadingly suggests that a level of knowledge
bordering on mere suspicion that tainted funds are involved is
enough to sustain a conviction. 102 In contrast, the Model Penal
been obvious to her. A finding beyond a reasonable doubt of a conscious pur-
pose to avoid enlightenment would permit an inference of knowledge. Stated
another way, a defendant's knowledge of a fact may be inferred upon willful
blindness to the existence of a fact.
It is entirely up to you as to whether you find any deliberate closing of eyes
and inferences to be drawn from any evidence. A showing of negligence is not
sufficient to support a finding of willfulness or knowledge.
I caution you that the willful blindness charge does not authorize you to find
that the defendant acted knowingly because she should have known what was
occurring when the property at 763 Sundown Road was being sold, or that in
the exercise of hindsight she should have known what was occurring or because
she was negligent in failing to recognize what was occurring or even because
she was reckless or foolish in failing to recognize what was occurring. Instead,
the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
purposely and deliberately contrived to avoid learning all of the facts.
Id. at 857 (emphasis added). The court of appeals did not address the propriety or the
instruction because neither party disputed its adequacy or applicability to the case. Id. This
version of the willful-blindness charge has been used frequently in the Fourth Circuit. E.g.,
United States v. Chorman, 910 F.2d 102, 107 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Cogdell, 844
F.2d 179, 181 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Martin, 773 F.2d 579, 584 (4th Cir. 1985).
101. The majority concluded that the conscious-purpose charge was deficient and recom-
mended use of the Model Penal Code version instead. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 704 n.21. How-
ever, the majority concluded that the error had not been preserved at the trial court level
and did not constitute plain error mandating reversal. Id. Judge (now Justice) Kennedy,
writing for the dissent, agreed with the majority that the conscious-purpose charge was defi-
cient and endorsed the Model Penal Code version of the willful-blindness charge. Id. at 705-
08 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He disagreed, however, with the majority's conclusion that the
error was harmless. Id. at 707-08.
102. The facts of United States v. Campbell, discussed infra parts I and IV.B, provide an
excellent illustration of how the conscious purpose jury instruction is misleading. The in-
struction in that case-that "a conscious purpose to avoid enlightenment" constitutes
knowledge, Campbell, 977 F.2d at 857-strongly implied that, once Helen Campbell simply
became suspicious that tainted funds were involved (as opposed to subjectively realizing
that a high probability existed that tainted funds were involved), she then was under an
affirmative duty to verify the nature of the funds or refrain from acting. In effect, this con-
veyed to the jury that it could convict Campbell simply because she suspected that tainted
money was involved, a conclusion bolstered by the jury's return of a guilty verdict notwith-
standing the slim evidence presented in the case. Although the district court attempted to
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Code version is straightforward and emphasizes the subjective na-
ture of the willful-blindness inquiry and the high level of knowl-
edge required. Its use for prosecutions under sections 1956 and
1957 is preferable.
3. The Value of Criminally Derved Property Exceeds $10,000
a. Structured Transactions
Section 1957's requirement that the tainted property involved
must exceed $10,000 in value substantially reduces the number of
transactions that potentially fall within the statute's ambit. The
scope of section 1957 could be further limited by Congress' failure
to include antistructuring language within its express terms.'03
This omission could be construed as meaning that an individual
who, for the pupose of avoiding liability under section 1957, inten-
tionally structures a transaction involving tainted funds exceeding
$10,000 in value into two or more smaller transactions, each involv-
ing funds of $10,000 or less, has not thereby committed a sec-
tion 1957 violation.
minimize the effect of the conscious purpose instruction by giving the further instruction
that even reckless failure on Campbell's part to recognize "what was occurring when the
property at 763 Sundown Road was being sold," id., was not enough to support a finding of
knowledge; that effort was far too weak and ambiguous to be of much help. This is particu-
larly true in light of the ambiguous nature of the conscious purpose instruction itself, which
immediately preceded the court's caveat.
Equating mere suspicion with actual knowledge is both inconsistent with Congress' intent
in enacting section 1957, H.R. REP. No. 855, supra note 8, at 13-14, and the theoretical
underpinnings of the willful-blindness theory itself. The willful-blindness theory requires a
level of subjective awareness of the likelihood of the existence of a fact which is markedly
higher than that required under a "mere suspicion," a "should have known," or even a
"reckless disregard" standard. See Jewell, 532 F.2d at 704 (" 'A court can properly find
wilful blindness only where it can almost be said that the defendant actually knew.' ")
(quoting GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 57, at 159 (2d ed.
1961)). It might be said that under the willful-blindness standard the defendant must be
almost certain of the existence of the fact in question. While the Model Penal Code's
"awareness of a high probability that at fact exists" standard adequately conveys this con-
cept, the "conscious purpose" instruction does not. Id. at 705-08 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
When the misleading nature of the jury instruction in Campbell is considered in tandem
with the appellate court's excessively deferential approach to the jury's verdict, the likeli-
hood that Campbell's § 1956 and § 1957 convictions were based on innocent conduct-mere
suspicion that tainted funds were involved-becomes all the more evident. See infra part
IV.B.
103. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (1988) with 31 U.S.C. § 5324(c) (1988). See infra note 108.
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Before the enactment of the Money Laundering Control Act, au-
thorities were split as to whether a crime is committed when trans-
actions are intentionally structured to circumvent the Bank Se-
crecy Act's $10,000 currency reporting requirements. 10 4 Courts
holding that it was a crime relied on a substance-over-form analy-
sis, piercing the myth that the structuring of a transaction to avoid
currency reporting requirements was lawful simply because doing
so was in technical compliance with the literal language of the
Bank Secrecy Act and its implementing regulations. 10 5 Courts
holding that it was not a crime relied on a due process rationale:
"'[A] penal statute [must] define the criminal offense with suffi-
cient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what con-
duct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbi-
trary and discriminatory enforcement.' "'106 The enactment of the
new antistructuring statute 0 7 has resolved this conflict with re-
spect to efforts to evade the Bank Secrecy Act's currency reporting
requirements. 08 The structuring question, however, remains unan-
swered with respect to section 1957
In this author's opinion, section 1957 should be construed as
criminalizing the intentional structuring of a transaction involving
104. Compare United States v. Massa, 740 F.2d 629, 645 (8th Cir. 1984) (upholding a
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for structuring transactions to avoid reporting require-
ments), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985) and United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d
1092, 1100 (11th Cir. 1983) (same) and United States v. Thompson, 603 F.2d 1200, 1203-04
(5th Cir. 1979) (upholding the conviction of a bank chairman for structuring transactions to
avoid filing a currency transaction report) with United States v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758, 762-
63 (9th Cir. 1986) .(reversing a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for structuring transac-
tions to avoid reporting requirements) and United States v. Denemark, 779 F.2d 1559, 1562-
64 (11th Cir. 1986) (same) and United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 682-83 (1st Cir.
1985) (same).
105. E.g., Massa, 740 F.2d at 645.
106. Varbel, 780 F.2d at 760 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).
107. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1354, 100 Stat. 3207-22 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1988)).
108. The new antistructuring provision reads as follows:
No person shall for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements of
section 5313(a) with respect to such transaction-
(1) cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to fail'to file a
report required under section 5313(a);
(2) cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to file a report
required under section 5313(a) that contains a material omission or misstate-
ment of fact; or
(3) structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure or assist in
structuring, any transaction with one or more domestic financial institutions.
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tainted funds exceeding $10,000 into two or more smaller transac-
tions for the purpose of avoiding liability under section 1957, not-
withstanding Congress' failure to state so explicitly One argument
against this conclusion is the existence of the antistructuring stat-
ute itself. That statute was enacted as part of the same legislative
package-the Money Laundering Control Act-in which sec-
tion 1957 was enacted. 0 9 It could thus be argued that, at the time
section 1957 was enacted, Congress was aware of the need to state
its intentions explicitly with respect to the structuring issue; there-
fore, its failure to do so with respect to section 1957 implies that it
did not intend for the statute to criminalize the intentional struc-
turing of a transaction to avoid the $10,000 threshold. 110
This argument fails, however, when one considers that, as origi-
nally proposed, section 1957 contained no minimum value thresh-
old at all."' The $10,000 threshold was only added during late-
night compromise sessions held during the final days before the
Money Laundering Control Act was enacted." 2 Before this last-
minute change, the need for explicit antistructuring language sim-
ply was not an issue. Given the hectic circumstances during which
the change was made, it is highly doubtful that the need for anti-
31 U.S.C. § 5324. For a comprehensive discussion and analysis of the antistructuring stat-
ute, see Sarah N. Welling, Smurfs, Money Laundering, and the Federal Criminal Law: The
Crime of Structuring Transactions, 41 FLA. L. REv. 287 (1989).
109. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
110. See United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 684 F.2d 1174, 1184-85 (6th Cir. 1982)
(stating that ordinarily, use of different language in two different sections of same Act cre-
ates an inference that Congress meant different things), aff'd, 464 U.S. 165 (1984).
111. See H.R. REP. No. 855, supra note 8.
112. The criminally derived property statute (now § 1957) was first introduced in Con-
gress as part of H.R. 5077, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). H.R. 5077 was reintroduced as H.R.
5217, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), and eventually incorporated into H.R. 5484, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1986), the bill that ultimately became the Omnibus Drug Enforcement, Education,
and Control Act of 1986 (Omnibus Drug Act), Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-1, of which
the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 is a part. As late as October 8, 1986, the pro-
posed criminally derived property statute in H.R. 5484 still did not contain any minimum
value threshold. 132 CONG. REc. 29,608, 29,642 (1986). In fact, the $10,000 threshold did not
appear in any published version of H.R. 5484 until October 17, 1986, the very day the House
and Senate finally agreed on a finalized version of H.R. 5484 and voted to enact the Omni-
bus Drug Act. Id. at 32,728. The Congressional Record reflects that during this interim
period (October 8-17, 1986), the Senate and House considered several last-minute amend-
ments and counteramendments to the Act. See, e.g., id. at 30,318, 31,407, 32,728. Nothing in
the Congressional Record, however, indicates exactly when, or for what reason, the $10,000
threshold was added to section 1957 during this interim period.
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structuring language was considered, much less consciously re-
jected, by Congress. In sum, the enactment of the antistructuring
statute sheds little light, one way or the other, on what Congress
intended with respect to section 1957 and the structuring
question.
To determine congressional intent, a more realistic, common
sense question should be asked: would allowing a person to escape
section 1957 liability by intentionally circumventing its $10,000
threshold, for the purpose of avoiding liability under the statute,
be in any way consistent with Congress' decision that the line be-
tween criminal and noncriminal conduct exists at $10,0009 The an-
swer is, "No." No legitimate distinction exists between the moral
culpability of an individual who violates section 1957 implicitly
(i.e., by intentionally breaking up a transaction involving tainted
funds exceeding $10,000 in value into two or more smaller transac-
tions) and the moral culpability of a person who violates sec-
tion 1957 explicitly (i.e., by engaging in a single transaction involv-
ing more than $10,000 in tainted funds).
In fact, normally the culpability of the person who violates sec-
tion 1957 implicitly is greater; a person who violates section 1957
explicitly does not necessarily act with a purpose related to flout-
ing the law. Such a person may properly be convicted even if he is
wholly unaware that the conduct violates the law 113 In contrast, a
person who violates section 1957 implicitly almost always does so
for some purpose or combination of purposes related to flouting
the law, including avoiding liability under section 1957, avoiding
the currency reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act, or
evading income taxes. It would be anomalous to suggest that Con-
113. Obviously, a conviction under § 1957 requires some knowledge that an illegality has
occurred-the government must prove that the defendant knew that the property involved
was "criminally derived." See supra part III.A.2; see also Liparota v. United States, 471
U.S. 419 (1985) (determining that a prosecution for food stamp fraud requires proof that the
defendant knew that she -was acting in a manner not authorized by statute or regulation).
However, the government need not prove-that the defendant was aware that the actual
conduct at issue-engaging in a transaction with that property-was itself a violation of the
law. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) (stating that the general rule in
the American legal system is that ignorance of the law is no defense to criminal
prosecution).
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gress intended to impose criminal liability not on persons who pur-
posely violate the law, but on those who do not.114
Notwithstanding the conclusion that it would be inconsistent
with congressional intent to construe section 1957 as not criminal-
114. It is not contended here that the intentional structuring of a monetary transaction
involving tainted funds in order to avoid the $10,000 threshold would constitute a § 1957
offense if done solely to avoid a currency transaction reporting requirement, to evade in-
come taxes, or for a combination of these two purposes. Such conduct constitutes a violation
of § 1956. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1988 & Supp. II 1990) (criminalizing engaging
in a financial transaction involving proceeds of specified unlawful activity knowing that the
transaction is designed in whole or in part "to avoid a transaction reporting requirement
under State or federal law"); id. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) (criminalizing engaging in a financial
transaction involving proceeds of specified unlawful activity "with intent to engage in con-
duct constituting a violation of section 7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986"). The intentional structuring of a monetary transaction involving tainted funds to
avoid the $10,000 threshold is of concern here only when done for the specific purpose of
avoiding liability under § 1957 itself.
The only legislative history on point supports the conclusion that, had Congress consid-
ered the matter, it would have intended that § 1957 be construed as crimmalizing efforts to
avoid its impact through transaction structuring. Senate Report 433 reveals that, at the
time § 1957 was enacted, Congress approved of those cases holding that it was a crime to
structure transactions to evade currency reportihg requirements notwithstanding the ab-
sence of an express prohibitive statutory provision. S. REP. No. 433, supra note 83, at 21.
Congress enacted the antistructuring statute simply to codify what it already believed was a
correct statement of the law. Id. at 22.
A related issue is whether the structuring of transactions to evade § 1957's $10,000
threshold should be construed as a violation of § 1956. Subsections (a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(2)(A),
and (a)(3)(A) of § 1956 criminalize knowingly engaging or attempting to engage in a trans-
action involving tainted funds (or funds represented to be tainted) "with the intent to pro-
mote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), (2)(A),
(3)(A). Because a § 1957 offense is included within § 1956's definition of "specified unlawful
activity," id. § 1956(c)(7), the structuring of transactions to evade § 1957 is arguably a vio-
lation of § 1956 under that statute's literal terms.
Nonetheless, such a construction should be rejected. The § 1956 and 1957 offenses only
fall within § 1956's definition of "specified unlawful activity" through a strange double
cross-reference with the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988). At the time of their enactment, the § 1956 and 1957 offenses
were added to the list of RICO predicate acts; two years later, Congress amended § 1956 to
add the RICO predicate acts to its list of "specified unlawful activity," thereby incorporat-
ing the § 1956 and 1957 offenses themselves as "specified unlawful activity." See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1956(c)(7), 1961(1). Obviously, Congress never intended by this to expand the substan-
tive scope of § 1956 to criminalize the intentional structuring of transactions to evade
§ 1957. To do so would mean that such conduct would be subject to greater criminal penal-
ties than those provided for under § 1957 itself, an absurd result. See Columbia Gas Dev.
Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 651 F.2d 1146, 1158 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating
that courts interpreting and construing two statutes that affect one particular subject mat-
ter or area should attempt to reconcile the two acts, if possible, so as to produce a symmetri-
cal result).
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izing the intentional structuring of transactions to avoid liability
under the statute, a due process inquiry remains. Is it fair to im-
pose criminal liability on someone who intentionally circumvents
section 1957's $10,000 threshold to avoid liability under the stat-
ute when no specific statutory language so provides? The due pro-
cess inquiry focuses on two often related but conceptually distinct
concerns: the statute's potential for discriminatory or arbitrary en-
forcement, and whether the statute provides fair notice to poten-
tial defendants that the conduct in question has been criminal-
ized.115 With respect to section 1957, the first concern is alleviated
so long as charging instruments and jury instructions emphasize
that the defendant's subjective, not objective, intent controls."
The second concern is more problematic. Can it fairly be said that
the absence of explicit antistructuring language within sec-
tion 1957's express terms somehow misleadingly suggests that one
does not commit a crime by intentionally breaking up a transac-
tion involving more than $10,000 in tainted funds into two or more
smaller transactions to avoid liability under the statute?
To answer this question, it is helpful to consider two hypotheti-
cal situations, both involving an actor who has access to $12,000 in
illicit funds, which he desires to deposit in a bank, and who is ap-
prised of section 1957's language. The first actor, wishing to avoid
criminal liability under section 1957, deposits exactly $10,000 in
the bank and leaves the remaining $2,000 where it is. The second
actor, also wishing to avoid criminal liability under section 1957,
simply makes two deposits of $6,000 each.
Imposition of section 1957 criminal liability on the first actor
would violate both due process and congressional intent. The first
situation is analogous to that of an automobile driver who chooses
to drive at exactly the sixty-five miles per hour speed limit. With-
out doubt, the driver straddles the line at the speed limit for the
very purpose of avoiding criminal liability The driver's purpose,
however, is irrelevant because the legislature has determined, and
has communicated to the public, that the speed limit is the point
where noncriminal conduct ends and criminal conduct begins. Sim-
ilarly, in the case of section 1957, Congress chose $10,000 as the
115. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
116. See infra part IV.A.
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line between criminal and noncriminal conduct and has communi-
cated this choice to the public. It is irrelevant that the first actor's
purpose was to avoid criminal liability 117 It also is irrelevant that
there may be little, if any, difference between the moral culpability
of the first actor and that of someone who knowingly engages in a
transaction involving funds exceeding $10,000 in value. The choice
of which categories of morally culpable conduct will be subject to
criminal sanctions involves the resolution of many competing pol-
icy considerations and is generally a choice for the legislature, not
the courts. 1 8
Imposition of section 1957 criminal liability on the second actor,
however, would violate neither due process nor congressional in-
tent. As was the first actor's purpose, the second actor's purpose
was to avoid criminal liability Unlike the first actor, however, the
second actor did not act on this purpose by modifying his or her
conduct to conform to the law. Instead, the second actor elected to
tread into an area that he unquestionably knew had been defined
as criminal by Congress. The second actor is simply trying to call
the conduct something it is not through technical manipulation.
This is not a case in which Congress has used ambiguous language
to define the line between criminal and noncriminal conduct and
therefore the second actor is unsure of whether the conduct has
been criminalized. Congress did not, for example, define the line at
"a high value" or an "extraordinarily large value.""19 Instead, Con-
gress has used a precise benchmark-$10,000-to define the line
between criminal and noncriminal conduct. Those who choose to
cross that line should not be allowed to escape the consequences of
their acts through technical manipulation.
117. Indeed, a primary purpose of the criminal law is to encourage conformance with the
law.
118. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) ("[B]ecause of the seriousness of
criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral condem-
nation of the community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity.").
119. An analogous situation would be if the state enacted a law prohibiting travelling at
"an unreasonable speed." Such a law would encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment. It also would raise legitimate questions of fair notice: is travelling 75 miles per hour
reasonable? To some yes, to others no.
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b. Knowledge That the Value of the Criminally Derwed
Property Exceeds $10,000
Although the government must prove that the value of the crim-
inally derived property exceeded $10,000, it should not be required
to prove that the defendant knew that the value of the criminally
derived property exceeded $10,000. Nothing in the grammatical
structure or legislative history of section 1957(a) suggests such a
conclusion. 120 Moreover, such a requirement would impose an al-
most impossible burden for the government to meet in many cases.
The following example illustrates this problem.
Suppose that the monetary transaction at issue in a section 1957
prosecution is a drug dealer's withdrawal of $30,000 from a bank
account, a transaction that also constituted the defendant's closing
of the account. At trial, the government establishes that from the
time the defendant opened the account to the time of its closure,
the defendant had deposited a total of $50,000 in legitimate funds
into the account and $50,000 in tainted funds. The account's larg-
est balance at any one time was $40,000. The government should
be allowed to meet its burden of proving that more than $10,000 of
the funds withdrawn were tainted through the use of accepted ac-
counting techniques that allocate various percentages of outgoing
funds to different sources of incoming funds.12' Even if the govern-
ment succeeds in accomplishing this objective, however, it would
be virtually impossible for the government also to establish that
the defendant knew that more than $10,000 of the funds with-
drawn were attributable to tainted funds. Few persons engage in
elaborate account analysis of this sort within their minds prior to
withdrawing funds from a bank account. It thus would be difficult,
if not impossible, for the government to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant in this example knew that the with-
120. See United States v. Yermtan, 468 U.S. 63 (1984). In Yerman, the Supreme Court,
faced with interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1001, looked to its predecessor statute for guidance:
"'[W]hoever shall knowingly and willfully make any false or fraudulent statements
or representations, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency
of the United States shall be fined.'" Id. at 69 n.6 (quoting Act of June 18, 1934, ch.
587, 48 Stat. 996 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1001)). The Court concluded that
under "any natural reading" of § 1001, "knowing and willfully" applied only to the making
of false or fraudulent statements or representations, not to the fact of jurisdiction. Id. at 69.
121. See infra part III.A.4.a.
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drawal involved more than $10,000 in tainted funds. Section 1957
should not be interpreted in a manner that would nullify it in a
situation in which Congress clearly intended it to apply 122
4. The Property Involved Was Derved from Specified
Unlawful Actwty
The final element of a section 1957 offense that the government
must establish beyond a reasonable doubt is that the criminally
derived property involved in the transaction at issue was derived
from specified unlawful activity 123 The term "specified unlawful
activity" has the same meaning as the term is given in subsection
(c)(7) of section 1956,124 which sets out a laundry list of state and
federal felonies "associated with organized crime, drug trafficking,
and financial misconduct.' 1 25 The government must allege and
prove all the essential elements of the particular "specified unlaw-
ful activity" from which the property at issue is criminally
derived. 26
a. Commingling
One problem posed by this element is commingling. What hap-
pens when the funds involved in a monetary transaction otherwise
satisfying the definition of a section 1957 offense come from a
source that contains both legitimate and illegitimate funds? The
issue typically arises when a monetary transaction involves the
transfer of a large sum from a bank account into which both legiti-
mate and illegitimate funds have been deposited. The question is
122. This approach also is consistent with well-established precedent that commission of
crimes of higher level larceny do not require knowledge by the defendant that the value of
the goods was sufficient to constitute higher level larceny. E.g., People v. Magee, 471
N.Y.S.2d 164 (App. Div. 1983) (holding that because the defendant stole a wallet with credit
cards, he committed grand larceny in the third degree despite the fact that he did not take
the credit cards, but only the cash); Hedge v. State, 229 S.W 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 1921)
(holding that defendant, who cashed a check from his debtor for more than was owed to
him, was guilty of larceny).
123. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (1988).
124. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
125. S. REP. No. 433, supra note 83, at 13.
126. United States v. Lovett, 964 F.2d 1029, 1041-42 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
169 (1992).
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whether more than $10,000 of the amount transferred can be at-
tributed to the tainted source.
Courts considering this issue under section 1956 have upheld
convictions based only upon evidence that the funds at issue were
transferred from a commingled account, notwithstanding the gov-
ernment's failure to demonstrate, through accounting evidence or
otherwise, that at least a portion of the transferred funds were
tainted.127 This view is understandable and probably flows from
section 1956's lack of a minimum value threshold; section 1956 is
triggered if any portion, no matter how slight, of the funds in-
volved in the transaction are the proceeds of specified unlawful ac-
tivity 128 In essence, the view that, in section 1956 prosecutions,
the government should not be required to demonstrate affirma-
tively that at least a portion of funds transferred from a commin-
gled account were tainted amounts to no more than recognition of
a nonconclusive, rebuttable presumption in favor of the govern-
ment; once the government has established beyond a reasonable
doubt that the funds at issue were transferred from a commingled
account, the jury is simply allowed to presume that at least a por-
tion of the funds so transferred were tainted, unless the defense
can rebut the presumption through accounting or other evi-
dence.1 29
In the case of section 1957, however, allowing the government to
prove this element through speculation or presumption would
render meaningless Congress' decision to criminalize only those
transactions involving more than $10,000 in tainted funds. Thus, in
a section 1957 case involving a commingled account, the govern-
ment should be required to prove affirmatively that more than
$10,000 of the funds transferred from the account were attributa-
ble to the tainted portion of the account. However, the government
should be allowed to meet this burden through the use of accepted
accounting techniques, or other reasonable methods, which deter-
mine the various percentages of the outgoing funds that are attrib-
127. See United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 840 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Conner, No. 90-3470, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 25370 (6th Cir. Oct. 23, 1991).
128. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956.
129. See County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979) (finding that a mandatory pre-
sumption requires the jury to find one fact if another fact is found unless the defense has
rebutted the connection between the two facts).
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utable to each source of incoming funds. Three such techniques
might be: 1) the "drugs-in, last-out" method; 2) the "averaging"
method; and 3) the "drugs-in, first-out" method. 30 The approach
that "reflects reality in any particular case will depend on the pre-
cise circumstances.''3
Obviously, the use of accounting techniques to determine the va-
rious percentages of outgoing funds attributable to each source of
incoming funds presents conceptual difficulties because of the fun-
gible nature of money 132 These conceptual difficulties make it im-
possible in most cases to prove to a mathematical certainty that
the percentages yielded by these methods are accurate. In fact, the
only time that the government could do so would be when the
amount of the outgoing transaction exceeds, by more than $10,000,
the total amount of all legitimate funds ever transferred into the
account. Our previous hypothetical illustrates this problem.' 33 The
drug dealer there had deposited a total of $50,000 in legitimate
funds and $50,000 in tainted funds into the account at issue. Only
a withdrawal in excess of $60,000 would have been guaranteed to a
mathematical certainty to be comprised of more than $10,000 in
tainted funds. Yet, the account never contained a balance of more
than $40,000 at any one time.
Not allowing the government to use accounting techniques to
prove this element, and instead requiring it to prove to a mathe-
matical certainty that more than $10,000 of the funds transferred
from a commingled account were tainted, would effectively allow
criminals to avoid section 1957 liability by simply commingling il-
legitimate funds with legitimate funds. This would defeat the pur-
pose of the statute. 3 4 Moreover, there is no procedural or due pro-
130. See United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir. 1986).
Banco Cafetero Panama involved the civil forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1982), under
which commingled funds are forfeitable to the extent they can be traced to an unlawful
transaction. Id. § 881(a)(6).
131. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d at 1160.
132. The court in Banco Cafetero Panama dealt with this issue by noting that in the civil
forfeiture context, Congress has placed the burden of uncertainty on the forfeitee. Id.
133. See supra part III.A.3.b.
134. See United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 840 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[W]e cannot be-
lieve that Congress intended that participants in unlawful activities could prevent their own
conviction under [section 1956] simply by commingling funds derived from both specified
unlawful activities and other activities.").
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cess reason for imposing such a heavy burden on the government.
The standard of proof in a criminal trial is not beyond all doubt,
but beyond a reasonable doubt. In section 1957 cases involving
commingled accounts, therefore, the government should be allowed
to prove this element through accepted accounting techniques or
other reasonable methods, so long as the jury is clearly instructed
that it may not find that more than $10,000 of the outgoing funds
were tainted unless it is convinced so beyond a reasonable
doubt.135
b. "Profits" of Cnminal Actwity
Although section 1957 is in part modeled on criminal statutes
that prohibit the sale or receipt of property stolen or obtained by
fraud,"3 6 unlike its predecessors, section 1957 is not limited to
funds stolen or obtained by fraud. The term "criminally derived
property" also includes "profits" of criminal activity, such as the
income earned by a drug dealer through illegal drug sales.137 The
inclusion of profits of criminal activity within the definition of
criminally derived property is significant for at least two reasons.
First, unlike the spending of funds stolen or obtained by fraud, the
spending of more generic profits of unlawful activity generally does
not constitute an interference with the property rights of other
persons. For example, the bank robber who spends stolen money is
dissipating the actual property of others, whereas the drug dealer
who spends profits from illegal drug activity is not interfering with
the property interests of other persons. 38 Thus, the government's
interest in protecting private property by preventing the dissipa-
tion of funds stolen or obtained by fraud is more compelling than
its interest in preventing the dissipation of general profits of un-
135. One commentator has contended that "[d]efendants [in money laundering prosecu-
tions] should be entitled to the same options afforded the government in Banco Cafetero
Panama, of choosing which accounting principle to apply to the commingling problem."
Strafer, supra note 16, at 188. Obviously, nothing prevents the defense from attempting to
rebut the government's case by presenting accounting evidence of its own.
136. See supra note 10.
137. See supra note 11.
138. But see United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 607 (1989) (refusing to differenti-
ate between profits from theft and profits from drug dealing for purposes of forfeiture under
21 U.S.C. § 853(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
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lawful activity, an important factor to consider when determining
the extent to which the governmental interests promoted by sec-
tion 1957 outweigh constitutional values such as the First Amend-
ment right to freedom of association and the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel." 9 Second, the generation of vast profits of unlaw-
ful activity is an endeavor particularly associated with the trade of
drug dealers and more "traditional" organized crime figures.
14 0
Stereotypical notions of how these criminals "look and act" are
commonplace. 4' Consequently, the probability of section 1957
verdicts of guilty, based almost entirely on evidence that the
source of the funds at issue fitted common stereotypes associated
with crime, is increased. Juries in such cases are more likely simply
to assume that the defendant must have known that criminally de-
rived property was involved. Allowing juries to engage in assump-
tions of this kind will not only violate congressional intent but also
infringe on First Amendment associational rights.'42
c. Property "Derived from" Proceeds of Specified
Unlawful Actwity
Section 1957 defines criminally derived property as "any prop-
erty constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained from a crimi-
139. Id., see infra note 272.
140. A Wall Street Journal article estimated that "illegal drugs, gambling, and vice gen-
erate $150 billion annually." 132 CoNG. REC. S9626 (daily ed. July 24, 1986) (statement of
Sen. Thurmond). Indeed, the growth of the illegal drug trade and its connection to organ-
ized crime was the genesis of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986. See supra part H.
141. See infra part IV.B. (discussing United States v. Campbell, 777 F Supp. 1259
(W.D.N.C. 1991), rev'd n part, 977 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 122 L. Ed. 2d 716
(1993)). Another example in this vein is Ricci v. Key Bancshares of Maine, Inc., 662 F
Supp. 1132 (D. Me. 1987), in which a bank was held liable under the Equal Credit Opportu-
nity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1982), for discrimination based on national origin. Ricci,
662 F Supp. at 1135. The plaintiff, Joseph Ricci, ran a school for treating troubled adoles-
cents. While reviewing some of the bank's records for an unrelated matter, an FBI agent
learned that Ricci was a customer of the bank. PAMELA H. Bucy, WHITE COLLAR CRIME.'
CASES AND MATERIALS 158 (1992) (detailing an interview with Robert Axelrod, lead counsel
for plaintiff). The agent then made the off-hand remark that "a" Joe Ricci was alleged to be
a high ranking member of the mafia. Id. Through word of mouth, the story eventually
reached bank officials that Joseph Ricci, the bank's customer and plaintiff, was in fact "the"
Joe Ricci of the mafia referred to by the FBI agent. Id. Although the rumor was totally
untrue, the bank terminated Joseph Ricci's line of credit the next day, without any investi-
gation whatsoever into the validity of the accusation. Id.
142. See infra part IV.B.
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nal offense. 143 The use of the term "derived from" leaves some
doubt concerning exactly when property arguably generated by un-
lawful activity but changed into other forms will no longer be con-
sidered criminally derived property 144
d. Sting Operations
In 1988, Congress added subsection (a)(3) to section 1956 to al-
low convictions under the financial transaction prong of that stat-
ute when the property involved is not the actual proceeds of un-
lawful activity but is instead "property represented to be the
proceeds of specified unlawful activity, or property used to conduct
or facilitate specified unlawful activity ,,145 Congress did not enact
a similar amendment with respect to section 1957 This omission
means that section 1957, unlike section 1956, does not criminalize
transactions involving government or otherwise legitimate funds,
regardless of whether such funds are represented to be illegitimate
by government undercover operants.
B. Limiting Application of Section 1957 to Conduct That
Congress Intended to Crimznalize
Legislatures have a well-documented tendency to define crimes
broadly so that all persons who engage in the conduct sought to
be criminalized are confronted " 'with a statutory facade that is
wholly devoid of loopholes.' ",146 This over-defining of crimes, how-
ever, also means that often categories of conduct that Congress did
not consider culpable and did not intend to criminalize will fall
within the literal terms of a criminal statute. Although the courts
should give effect to legislative policy judgments as long as they do
not conflict with the Constitution, this does not mean that the
courts should blindly apply a criminal statute against a defendant,
in accordance with its "literal" language, when doing so is inconsis-
143. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
144. See infra part IV.A for a suggested standard for addressing this problem.
145. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6465, 102 Stat. 4375 (1988) (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)
(1988)).
146. Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 Am. J.
CoMP. L. 532, 533 (1970) (quoting A.B. COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, ORGANIZED CRIME
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 75 (1952)).
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tent with congressional intent. Even in the absence of constitu-
tional concerns, it is entirely appropriate for the courts to narrow
the applicability of a criminal statute so that persons whom Con-
gress did not intend to brand as criminals are not ensnared by a
literal application of the statute.
Fortunately, at least two procedural devices are available to the
courts to reduce the likelihood of such convictions. The first is the
creation of new elements of the offense that go beyond those stated
expressly in the words of the statute. 147 The second is the allow-
ance of appropriate jury instructions, when timely requested by
the defense, to narrow the scope of the statute's literal language to
cover only conduct Congress intended to criminalize. 148
Both of these measures have the same basic goal: to narrow the
net of a criminal statute so that innocent individuals are not
caught within its literal terms, but to do so in a manner that does
not allow blameworthy individuals to escape the statute's conse-
quences. It should be noted, however, that allowing timely defense
requests for jury instructions is generally a more preferable solu-
tion to this problem than the trial or appellate courts' postconvic-
tion creation of new elements of the offense. 149 Elements of an of-
fense must be included in the charging instrument and submitted
to the trial jury as part of the government's prima facie case. 150 If
the government has failed to include an element of the offense in
the charging instrument, or if the trial judge has failed to submit
the element to the trial jury as part of the government's prima fa-
cie case, any resulting conviction must be set aside."5' This is true
even if the evidence at trial overwhelmingly supported a finding
that the new element existed beyond a reasonable doubt, 52 and
147. See, e.g., United States v. Keith, 605 F.2d 462, 464 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[A]n indictment
is inadequate when it fails to allege an essential element of the offense even when it tracks
the language of the statute.").
148. Another measure is the exercise of prosecutorial discretion not to file charges even
though conduct that technically falls within the terms of a statute has been committed; the
prosecutor may legitimately decline to bring a criminal charge even though a person has
engaged in culpable conduct. See LaFave, supra note 146, at 536.
149. See infra note 156.
150. See United States v. King, 587 F.2d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 1978).
151. Id.
152. The failure of an indictment to allege all elements of the offense charged renders it
fatally deficient. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1962); King, 587 F.2d at
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even if the defense did not raise the error prior to or during trial. 153
The motivation and opportunity for defense sandbagging is appar-
ent.154 Moreover, usually the need for narrowing a statute's scope
does not arise directly from the wording of the statute but instead
arises implicitly from an examination of legislative intent, which is
rarely unambiguous. Accordingly, the waste of resources that re-
sults from correction of the problem through post hoc creation of a
new element usually is not justifiable on the ground that federal
prosecutors "should have known" to include the element in the
charging instrument and jury instructions. 5 Requiring the defense
to submit timely requests for jury instructions allows the trial
court to resolve the issue of whether the scope of a criminal statute
should be narrowed before the jury retires to consider its verdict,
possibly avoiding the need for a new trial. 56
963; United States v. Purvis, 580 F.2d 853, 858 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 914
(1979). The omission of an element of the crime charged is not a mere error of formality;
rather, it is a deficiency of constitutional magnitude. Inclusion of all the required elements
ensures that the grand jury has considered and found all essential elements of the offense
charged, as required by the Fifth Amendment's guarantee that "[n]o person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of
a Grand Jury." Russell, 369 U.S. at 760. Additionally, an indictment that fails to allege all
essential elements of the offense charged potentially results in a deprivation of other Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights. United States v. Wylie, 919 F.2d 969, 972 (5th Cir. 1990).
153. See FED. R. CRIM. P 12(b)(2) (stating that objections to the indictment or to the
information's failure to charge an offense must be recognized by the court at any time).
154. See Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23 (1977). In Lee, the trial judge dismissed the
indictment in the middle of a bench trial because the indictment did not contain an essen-
tial element. Id. at 26-27. The judge did so even though the defendant waited until just
prior to trial to raise the objection, id. at 25, and even though the evidence was overwhelm-
ingly in favor of guilt. Id. at 26. Although the Supreme Court held that double jeopardy did
not bar retrial of the defendant, id. at 34, the defendant's last-minute timing was at least
partially successful: it bought him more time to negotiate with the prosecutors and gave him
a second shot at presenting a defense. Sandbagging until after trial provides another advan-
tage: the defendant gets a free shot at acquittal with the first jury. Id. at 32. If unsuccessful,
the defendant still has the opportunity to obtain an acquittal at the second trial.
155. See id. at 34 (finding that prosecutors' omission of element in the indictment "was at
most an act of negligence, as prejudicial to the Government as to the defendant").
156. Criminal defense attorneys do not always sandbag, of course. They often raise the
issue of the prosecution's failure to include a necessary element prior to or during trial. If
the issue is raised pretrial, it is usually raised by a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss the
indictment for failure to charge an offense. Necessary elements may include "hidden" ele-
ments that do not arise directly from the wording of the statute and which the courts have
not previously recognized.
Even at the pretrial stage, recognition of a new element will result in the expenditure of
considerable resources because the indictment must be dismissed and the case resubmitted
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This is not to say that postconviction creation of new elements
of an offense is never appropriate; the dictates of Russell v. United
States,5 7 its progeny, and other law must be followed. It is only to
say that use of this measure to narrow the scope of criminal stat-
utes imposes considerable costs on the criminal justice system and
therefore should be approached with circumspection. The accom-
plishment of the same objective by requiring-and allowing, when
appropriate-defense requests for jury instructions will normally
be the preferred approach.
The effort here, therefore, is first to identify conduct that falls
within the literal terms of section 1957 but which Congress did not
intend to criminalize. For each category of conduct so identified, a
jury instruction is recommended to protect persons from being
convicted on the basis of such conduct without also insulating
those who have engaged in conduct that Congress did seek to
criminalize. Three hypotheticals, each describing conduct within
the literal terms of section 1957, will be used to aid this analysis.
Scenario 1. An automobile dealer sells a $30,000 automobile to
a drug dealer and receives $30,000 in exchange. At the time of the
sale, the automobile dealer knows that the $30,000 are proceeds of
unlawful drug activity Otherwise, the sale is an ordinary com-
mercial transaction-neither the drug dealer nor the automobile
dealer engaged in the transaction to conceal or disguise the
tainted funds.
The use of section 1957 to prosecute persons who engage m
monetary transactions completely unrelated to actual money laun-
dering activity presents significantly greater potential for abuse
than does its use to prosecute persons who engage in transactions
for purposes related to money laundering. 58 Nonetheless, the lan-
to the grand jury. See FED. R. CRIM. P 6, 48. Accordingly, the use of appropriate jury in-
structions should be the preferred method of narrowing the scope of a statute's literal
language.
157. 369 U.S. 749 (1962) (holding that indictments charging violations of 2 U.S.C. § 192,
which makes it a crime to refuse to answer certain questions when summoned before a con-
gressional committee, are defective unless they specify the question under congressional in-
quiry which the defendant allegedly failed to answer). The Court " 'noted that the accused
must be apprised by the indictment, with reasonable certainty, of the nature of the accusa-
tion against him.'" Id. at 766 (quoting United States v. Simmons, 96 U.S. 360, 362 (1877)).
158. See supra part III.A.2.d; mira part IV.B.
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guage of section 1957111 and its legislative history160 leave little
doubt that the statute reflects a legislative policy judgment that
both of the following categories of activity constitute morally cul-
pable activity warranting criminal sanctions: 1) the spending of il-
legitimate funds by those who have engaged in the criminal activ-
ity that generated the funds, and 2) the knowing receipt or other
handling of illegitimate funds by those who did not engage or as-
sist in the criminal activity that generated such funds but who
nonetheless intentionally profit from criminal activity by accepting
or handling illegitimate funds while providing goods or services.
Because both the drug dealer and automobile dealer in this scena-
rio engaged in conduct of this type, no special jury instruction is
warranted to isolate their conduct from th6 effect of section 1957
Scenario 2: A jeweler sells a $20,000 watch, receives $20,000 in
exchange, and places the entire amount in the store's safe. At the
time of the sale, the jeweler does not know that the $20,000 are
proceeds of unlawful activity Later the same day, however, the
jeweler is told by a reliable individual that the person who pur-
chased the watch did so with proceeds of unlawful drug activity
The jeweler is unsure of what to do with the $20,000 but does not
want to keep it in the store safe. Consequently, the next morning
the jeweler deposits the $20,000 in the store's bank account.
Later, after thinking the matter over, the jeweler reports the mat-
ter to the police.
The jeweler's deposit of the $20,000 in the store's bank account,
although within the literal terms of section 1957, is not the type of
transaction that Congress intended to criminalize under the stat-
ute. In United States v. Sheridan,6' the Supreme Court sug-
gested in dicta that submission of an "innocent purpose" defense
to the jury is the appropriate solution to this problem.162 At issue
in Sheridan was the statutory provision of 18 U.S.C. § 2314:
"Whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce any
goods of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to
have been stolen" shall be guilty of a crime.163 By its terms, this
159. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 8-11 and accompanying text.
161. 329 U.S. 379 (1946).
162. Id. at 390.
163. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1988).
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provision criminalizes the knowing transportation of stolen goods
without regard to whether the goods were transported with unlaw-
ful or fraudulent intent.1 64 Nonetheless, the Court concluded that
it could be inferred that Congress intended to criminalize the
knowing transportation of stolen goods only when done with un-
lawful or fraudulent intent:
One who knowingly transports stolen goods would do so for one
of three sorts of objects, namely: (1) to dispose of them or use
them unlawfully; (2) to aid in concealing the theft, thus avoid-
ing prosecution for himself or another; or (3) for some purpose
wholly innocent, such as to turn them over to the police or the
rightful owner.
In the first two instances there would be inherent in the act
"unlawful intent" or "fraudulent intent," though proof of this
might not be required apart from the proof of knowledge and
absence of any showing of innocent purpose. Congress obviously
did not intend to make criminal such an instance as the
third."6 5
The reasoning of the Sheridan dicta applies fully to sec-
tion 1957, which also should be construed as criminalizing only
conduct that the defendant engaged in with unlawful or fraudulent
intent.66 The only question is whether the narrowing of sec-
tion 1957 in this manner should be accomplished by requiring the
government to allege and prove unlawful or fraudulent intent as an
element of the offense or by granting a defense request for an "in-
nocent purpose" jury instruction. The Sheridan dicta suggests that
the latter is the appropriate solution. 167
After comparing the language of the statutory provision at issue,
which did not expressly require "unlawful or fraudulent" intent,
with the language of other provisions of section 2314, which ex-
pressly required "unlawful or fraudulent" intent, the Court stated:
[P]roof of the innocent intent might be required as matter of
defense, the other elements being made out. In other words, it
may well be doubted that adding the requirement "with unlaw-
164. Sheridan, 329 U.S. at 385 & n.11.
165. Id. n.11 (emphasis added).
166. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
167. See Sheridan, 329 U.S. at 392.
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ful or fraudulent intent" in [the other provisions of sec-
tion 2314] added anything to the substantive crime; for its ef-
fect [in the other provisions] is apparently only to require the
state to allege and prove the unlawful or fraudulent intent,
rather than to require the defendant to allege and prove his in-
nocent purpose.116
The implication of the Sheridan dicta-that in section 1957
prosecutions the defendant should bear the burden of raising the
"innocent purpose" defense by requesting a jury instruction to
that effect-is persuasive. As previously noted, the post hoc recog-
nition of new elements not expressly within the terms of a criminal
statute poses substantial costs on the criminal justice system. 169 In
addition, in many section 1957 cases no evidence will exist sup-
porting the inference that the defendant did not act with unlawful
or fraudulent intent.170 Requiring juries in such cases to consider
unlawful or fraudulent intent anyway (as an element of the of-
fense) would only obfuscate more relevant issues. By instead re-
quiring the defense timely to request an "innocent purpose" jury
instruction, the court may properly deny the request if no evidence
exists to support the defense's claim.' 71
The Sheridan dicta also implies that section 1957 defendants
should bear the burden of proving innocent purpose. The more
prudent approach, however, is to place the burden of proof on the
government to rebut innocent purpose once the defendant has re-
quested the instruction and some evidence has been produced to
support the instruction. 72 The following jury instruction is consis-
tent with this approach:
It is an absolute defense to the charge made against the de-
fendant in Count __ that the defendant engaged in the mone-
tary transaction referred to therein with a wholly innocent pur-
pose, such as [state applicable innocent purpose here, e.g., to
168. Id. at 385 n.11.
169. See supra note 156.
170. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562, 567-68 (10th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Lovett, 964 F.2d 1029, 1037 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 169 (1992).
171. United States v. Rochester, 898 F.2d 971, 978-79 (5th Cir. 1990); see also United
States v. Troutman, 814 F.2d 1428, 1451-52 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that jury instructions
unrelated to the charged crime are properly omitted).
172. See United States v. Hurley, 281 F Supp. 443, 447 (D. Conn. 1968).
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turn the property referred to therein to the police or the rightful
owner].
The burden of establishing lack of innocent purpose rests
upon the prosecution. The defendant is under no obligation to
prove innocent purpose; rather, the prosecution must prove lack
of innocent purpose beyond a reasonable doubt.'
Scenario 3: A drug dealer approaches a bank teller and re-
quests to deposit $250,000 in the bank. The teller knows that the
$250,000 is criminally derwed property Consequently, the teller
requests instructions from a bank officer, informing the officer of
the illegal nature of the proposed deposit. Nonetheless, to avoid
losing a lucrative customer, the officer instructs the teller to ac-
cept the deposit. The teller does so.
In terms of culpability, the bank officer's conduct in this hypo-
thetical is essentially indistinguishable from that of the automobile
dealer in Scenario 1. More problematic are the actions of the
teller, who has performed what is essentially a ministerial act. Al-
though there was some testimony before the House of Representa-
tives that section 1957 was intended to reach those who perform
ministerial duties, 17 4 there is no mention of such a purpose in
House Report 855. On the contrary, the House Report emphasizes
the culpability of persons who knowingly engage in a monetary
transaction for the purpose of profiting directly and personally
from the transaction.17 5 Although it is arguable that the teller in
the hypothetical profited indirectly from the transaction in the
sense that making the transaction allowed the teller to keep his
job, House Report 855 suggests that liability may be imposed
173. Cf. LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 1 8.01 (1984) (sug-
gesting a similar instruction for a charge of tax evasion).
174. Money Laundering Legislation: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 106 (1986) [hereinafter Money Laundering Hearings] (statement
of Mr. James D. Harmon, Jr., Executive Director and Chief Counsel, President's Commis-
sion on Organized Crime). Mr. Harmon stated that
those responsible for mere ministerial duties (such as the picking up or deliv-
ery of the funds being laundered) may not know all the details of their clients'
activities, but are highly likely to be exposed to information that gives them
actual knowledge (or reason to know) the true nature or source of the funds
they are laundering.
Id.
175. H.R. REP. No. 855, supra note 8, at 13-14.
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under section 1957 only if the defendant expected to profit di-
rectly and personally from the transaction. 11 6 Moreover, because li-
ability may be imposed under section 1957 without regard to
whether the defendant was aware that he was violating the law,
subjecting the teller to section 1957's severe penalties would con-
stitute a gross injustice, one Congress surely did not intend. The
following jury instruction is thus recommended to limit the appli-
cability of section 1957 in this situation:
Even if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defend-
ant knowingly engaged or attempted to engage in a monetary
transaction m criminally derived property that is of a value
greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful ac-
tivity, as alleged in Count -, you must acquit the defendant
if his/her acts were merely ministerial, i.e., he/she did not en-
gage in the monetary transaction to profit directly and per-
sonally.
The defendant is under no obligation to prove that his/her ac-
tions were merely ministerial. The prosecution bears the burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's ac-
tions were not merely ministerial.
17
7
IV CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
A. Vagueness Doctrine
Congress' endorsement of a willful-blindness standard for prose-
cutions under sections 1956 and 1957 has led to criticism of both
statutes on vagueness grounds.1 7 8 In this author's opinion, imple-
176. Id.
177. Cf. SAND ET AL., supra note 173, % 8.01 (suggesting the same culpability standard for
similar offenses).
178. One commentator, G. Richard Strafer, expressed his concerns as follows:
Congress expressly intended the term "knowing" to encompass instances of
"willful blindness." By way of guidance, the Senate Report gives the following
examples:
Thus, a currency exchanger who participates in a transaction with a
known drug dealer involving hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash
and accepts a commission far above the market rate, could not escape
conviction, from the first tier of the offense, simply by claiming that he
did not know for sure that the currency involved m the transaction was
derived from crime. On the other hand, an automobile car dealer who
sells a car at market rates to a person whom he merely suspects of in-
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menting a willful-blindness standard for section 1956 and 1957
prosecutions would require careful scrutiny of jury verdicts for suf-
ficiency of the evidence but would not render either statute void
for vagueness.
A criminal statute is void for vagueness when the state has used
in the statute inherently ambiguous language that leaves potential
defendants guessing as to the standard of liability under the stat-
ute. 179 In United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., s0 for example,
the Supreme Court struck down a statute that criminalized the
charging of "unjust or unreasonable" rates.' The Court concluded
that the standard resulted in "the widest conceivable inquiry, the
scope of which no one can foresee and the result of which no one
can foreshadow or adequately guard against."' 82 More recently, in
Gentile v. State Bar,'s' the Court reversed the imposition of sanc-
tions against an attorney for violating a state ethical rule that pro-
volvement with crime, cannot be convicted of this offense in the absence
of a showing that he knew something more about the transaction or the
circumstances surrounding it.
The examples provided in the Senate Report underscore the statute's vague-
ness. If the automobile dealer in the second example sells a vehicle at the mar-
ket rate to the known drug dealer in the first example (rather than merely the
suspected drug dealer in the second example), has he then violated sec-
tion 1956? If the currency exchanger in the first example accepts only a rea-
sonable commission, is he no longer guilty9 What if the currency exchanger
accepts a huge commission, but merely suspects the individual he is dealing
with is a drug dealer; does the size of the commission plus suspicion satisfy the
government's burden of proof? Neither the language of section 1956 nor its
legislative history provides answers to these simple variations on the hypothet-
icals advanced in the Senate Report.
Strafer, supra note 16, at 167 (quoting S. REP. No. 433, supra note 83, at 10) (footnotes
omitted). To date, courts that have considered vagueness challenges to sections 1956 and
1957 have rejected them. E.g., United States v. Long, 977 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir. 1992) (§
1956(a)(1)(B)(i)); United States v. Gilliam, 975 F.2d 1050 (4th Cir. 1992) (§
1956(a)(1)(B)(i)-(ii)); United States v. Awan, 966 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1992) (§
1956(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B)); United States v. Loehr, 966 F.2d 201 (6th Cir.) (§ 1956(a)(3)(B)),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 655 (1992); United States v. Antzoulatos, 962 F.2d 720 (7th Cir.)
(§ 1956(a)(1), (a)(1)(B), (c)(1)-(7)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 331 (1992); United States v.
Jackson, 935 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1991) (§ 1956(a)(1)); United States v. Krenning, No. 91-514
§ N, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11283 (E.D. La. July 17, 1992) (§ 1957).
179. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
180. 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
181. Id. at 81, 93.
182. Id. at 89.
183. 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991).
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hibited commenting on current litigation to the press. The attor-
ney had relied on a safe-harbor provision to a general rule that
allowed explanation of the "general" nature of defenses without
further "elaboration. '184 The Court concluded that the terms "gen-
eral" and "elaboration," as used in the safe-harbor provision, were
"classic terms of degree" with "no settled usage or tradition of in-
terpretation in the law." '185
One of the underlying principles of the vagueness doctrine, as
underscored in cases such as Cohen Grocery and Gentile, is that
no one should be subject to criminal sanctions for violating a nor-
mative standard that is not defined with reasonable precision, if at
all, until after the conduct in question has been committed.186 The
application of the willful-blindness standard to prosecutions under
sections 1956 and 1957 does not violate this principle. As previ-
ously shown, the willful-blindness standard, when properly articu-
lated, has a settled usage or tradition of interpretation in the law
that involves the defendant's subjectwe state of mind.18 7 In a sec-
tion 1957 prosecution, the defendant cannot be found guilty under
the willful-blindness standard unless the jury finds beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant was aware that there was a high
probability that the transaction involved criminally derived prop-
erty, unless she actually believed such high probability did not ex-
ist.""8 The question for the jury is not whether a reasonable person
in the defendant's shoes would have concluded that such a high
probability existed, but whether the defendant subjectively be-
lieved that such a high probability existed. If the jury finds that
the defendant did not believe that a high probability existed, it
184. Id. at 2731.
185. Id.
186. When a jury or other decisionmaker is faced with a vague normative standard, it
must first attempt to define the standard, at least in the decisionmaker's own mind, before
it can then determine whether the defendant's conduct complied with the standard. The
vagueness concern, therefore, is not that a normative standard is never given reasonably
precise definition, but that this occurs only after commission of the conduct in question.
The underlying principles of the vagueness doctrine are thus in many respects similar to
those underlying the ex post facto doctrine. See generally Neil C. McCabe & Cynthia A.
Bell, Ex Post Facto Provisions of State Constitutions, 4 EMERG. ISSUES ST. CONsT. L. 133,
133-40 (outlining the purposes behind the federal ex post facto doctrine).
187. See supra part III.A.2.d.
188. See supra part III.A.2.d.
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must acquit the defendant regardless of how objectively unreason-
able the defendant's belief was. 189
Under the willful-blindness standard, therefore, the jury must
answer one essential question: given a known, reasonably precise
normative standard, did the defendant's state of mind match that
standard? In contrast, the jury faces two tasks when called upon to
apply an objective, or reasonable person, normative standard: it
must first give precision to the vague normative standard by mak-
ing a value judgment concerning applicable "community stan-
dards" or similarly amorphous criteria, and then determine
whether the defendant's conduct matched that standard. It is the
failure of a decisionmaker to perform this first task prior to the
commission of the conduct at issue that poses constitutional vague-
ness concerns, not its failure to perform the second.
Without doubt, of course, juries sometimes err and find innocent
defendants guilty even when faced with an entirely subjective sci-
enter standard. This dilemma, however, is the natural consequence
of asking a factfinder to "look" into the defendant's past state of
mind. It is no more peculiar to cases involving the willful-blindness
standard than it is to cases involving other subjective scienter ele-
ments, such as willfulness, actual knowledge, or intent. No one
would suggest that the solution to this problem is to invalidate, on
grounds of vagueness, all criminal statutes that involve a subjective
scienter element. Rather, the solution is the use of procedural
mechanisms that reduce the probability of erroneous judgments of
guilt-for example, carefully worded jury instructions emphasizing
that the willful-blindness inquiry is a subjective, not objective, in-
quiry, and meaningful review of jury verdicts for sufficiency of the
evidence. 9 0
A more tenable criticism of section 1957 on vagueness grounds is
its use of the term "criminally derived property," which is defined
only as "property constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained
from a criminal offense."'' Bankers, merchants, attorneys, and
others who must deal commercially with the public can legiti-
189. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S.
78, 86, 87 (1944); Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1896).
190. See infra notes 227-31 and accompanying text for further discussion of these devices.
191. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(2) (1988).
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mately complain that to some extent section 1957 leaves them
guessing as to how close the connection must be between criminal
activity and property arguably generated by such activity before
the statute is triggered. A reasonably precise articulation of sec-
tion 1957's definition of "property constituting proceeds ob-
tained from a criminal offense" can be garnered by reference to the
drug forfeiture statute.192 Among other things, this statute declares
forfeitable "[a]ll moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or
other things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any
person in exchange for a controlled substance."' 193 With this defini-
tion for guidance, under section 1957 "property constituting
proceeds obtained from a criminal offense" would generally be lim-
ited to the original cash or other property generated by specified
unlawful activity-such as the actual "street cash" a drug dealer
receives from his customers. Once these original proceeds have
been transformed, however, by placing them in a bank account for
instance, they would constitute criminally derived property under
section 1957 only if they fall within its "derived from" language.
This is where vagueness problems potentially can occur. What
exactly does "derived from" mean? At what point does the connec-
tion between the original proceeds and the transformed property
become too attenuated to say fairly that the latter is derived from
the former 9 Unless some attempt is made to articulate some rea-
sonably precise definition of when the transformed property is no
longer considered "derived from" the original illegal proceeds, the
vagueness problem remains. 94
192. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988).
193. Id. § 881(a)(6). For a discussion of § 881, see Henry C. Darmstadter & Leslie J.
Mackoff, Some Constitutional and Practical Considerations of Civil Forfeitures Under 21
U.S.C. § 881, 9 WHITHER L. REv. 27 (1987).
194. Indeed, in its most recent case involving forfeiture, the Supreme Court referred to
this very problem:
As a postscript we identify [an] issue[] that the parties have addressed, but
that need not be decided.
At oral argument, the Government suggested that [21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(6)'s] reference to "all proceeds traceable to such and exchange" is
subject to a narrowing construction that might avoid some of [its] harsh conse-
quences If a house were received in exchange for a quantity of illegal
substances and that house were in turn exchanged for another house, would
the traceable proceeds consist of the first house, the second house, or both,
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The drug forfeiture statute contains "traceable" language that is
similar to the "derived from" language of section 1957 195 Unfortu-
nately, case law interpreting this language provides little guidance
on the attenuation question.19 6 An approach suggested here, at
least with respect to section 1957, would be to consider the origi-
nal criminal proceeds as criminally derived property, despite trans-
formation of that property into other forms, until after some inter-
vening legitimate use has been made of the property that
dissipates its taint. Under this approach, for example, the original
cash receipts generated by a drug dealer would be considered
"criminally derived property" even if they are placed in a bank
account, transferred among various accounts, and eventually used
to purchase a house for the drug dealer. However, the house itself
(as opposed to the money used to purchase the house) would not
be considered "criminally derived property" so long as the drug
dealer purchased it simply to live in, and not to facilitate his illegal
drug business, at least with respect to further transactions con-
cerning the house by persons other than the drug dealer. Thus, a
subsequent buyer of the property from the drug dealer would not
be committing a section 1957 violation even if she purchased the
property with knowledge that the drug dealer had purchased the
house originally with drug proceeds. Without this or a similar ap-
proach, property generated from crime theoretically would remain
tainted forever and could never again be put to legitimate eco-
nomic use.
with the Government having an election between the two? Questions of this
character are not embraced within the issues that we granted certiorari to re-
solve, however, and for that reason we express no opinion concerning the
proper construction of that statutory term.
United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 122 L. Ed. 2d 469, 485-86 (1993) (citations
omitted).
195. Section 881(a)(6) also provides for forfeiture of, inter alia, "all proceeds traceable to
[the original proceeds of the drug offense]." 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1158 (2d Cir.
1986) (finding that the forfeiture statute covers any asset exchanged directly for narcotics,
as well as assets indirectly exchanged for narcotics in one or more " 'intervening legitimate
transactions, or otherwise changed in form.' ") (quoting Joint Explanatory Statement of Ti-
tles II and III, Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, 92 Stat. 3768, 3774-
78, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9518, 9522).
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B. First Amendment Freedom of Associatin
In enacting section 1957, Congress fully expected that the stat-
ute would be used to impose criminal liability on those who profit
indirectly from criminal activity by knowingly accepting or other-
wise handling criminally derived property while providing ordi-
nary, legitimate goods or services, regardless of whether such per-
sons are law-abiding citizens in other respects.197 Congress'
principal purpose in doing so was to reduce the motivation of
criminals to engage in unlawful activity by making it more difficult
for them to enjoy the fruits of their crimes and thereby lessening
their motive and opportunity to engage in more crime.19 Without
doubt, therefore, the very purpose of section 1957 is to chill a par-
ticular type of association, albeit a type of association that Con-
gress has defined as criminal. Few would argue that section 1957
violates the First Amendment simply because its purpose or effect
is to frustrate criminal associations of this kind.1 99
Far more problematic is the incidental effect that section 1957
has or could have on noncriminal associations that are protected
under the First Amendment. The issue is whether section 1957
will cause bankers, merchants, and other business persons to re-
frain from dealing with a customer simply because that individual
is a criminal, is reputed to be a professional criminal, or fits com-
mon stereotypes of how professional criminals look and act.200 One
commentator articulated this concern in the following passage dis-
cussing the chilling effect that section 1956 could pose to associa-
tional rights protected under the First Amendment:
What banker or businessman will run the risk of triggering
section 1956's onerous twenty year penalties in order to engage
in an ordinary financial transaction with someone he "suspects,"
or is told by an overzealous law enforcement officer that the
government suspects, of being "a criminal." Section 1956 at-
197. See supra part III.B.
198. See H.R. REP. No. 855, supra note 8, at 13-14.
199. The logical conclusion of such an argument would be that criminal conspiracies are
associations protected under the First Amendment.
200. Strafer, supra note 16, at 171.
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tempts to transform such suspects into commercial pariahs that
bankers and businessmen will shun.20
1
Prior to enacting the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, sev-
eral members of Congress attempted to allay such fears:
The following example illustrates the potential problem
that an expansive reading of the state of mind [requirement]
would have in extending the reach of the offense beyond that
intended by the Committee. The corner grocer in a small com-
munity is aware of the reputation of a person who is the local
drug trafficker. That person comes to the store and buys five
pounds of hamburger. The grocer takes the cash and deposits it
in his bank account with his other receipts. The financial trans-
action is the act of the grocer depositing his day's receipts in his
bank account. The question is whether the grocer is guilty of
violating [section 1957].
As Mr. McCollum observed, "You [the grocer] have to know
what he is coming in to buy groceries with is indeed, the money
derived from the particular designated crimes; and to get to that
point, you would have to prove to a jury [that the grocer knew
that] the fellow had no other source of income or that [if] he
had-the grocer had some more direct knowledge this fellow was
just standing outside on that street corner before he came in
peddling drugs, like if [the grocer] saw him doing it. [Under
those circumstances] I don't have any problem whatsoever hold-
ing the grocer accountable if he sees the guy [the trafficker]
outside dealing in drugs and takes cash and walk[s] into his
store."
Mr. Lungren stated his understanding of the Committee's use
of the term "knowingly", "It is a 'knowing' standard. I think it is
repetitive of what he [Mr. McCollum] said, but I think that is
extremely important. It is not 'should have known, might have
known, a reasonable person would have known', it is 'this per-
son knew the source of the income' "202
Nonetheless, in the very first reported case under section 1957
involving the archetypical section 1957 defendant-a businessper-
son alleged to have knowingly handled tainted funds while provid-
ing goods or services to a criminal but not alleged to have engaged
201. Id.
202. H.R. REP. No. 855, supra note 8, at 13-14 (emphasis added).
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or assisted in the criminal activity that generated the funds-the
jury returned a verdict of guilty based primarily on evidence that
the customer "looked and acted" like a professional criminal.2 °3
The defendant in United States v. Campbell 20 4 was Ellen Camp-
bell, a real estate agent who had arranged for the purchase of a
home by a man named Mark Lawng.205 The home was located in a
vacation and waterfront luxury area near Charlotte, North Caro-
lina.206 After seeing Campbell's photograph at the real estate office
where she worked, Lawing contacted her, presented himself as the
owner of an autocraft business, and indicated that he was inter-
ested in purchasing a home.07 Thereafter, during a period of ap-
proximately five weeks, Campbell met with Lawing once a week
during normal business hours and showed him ten to twelve
homes; Lawing eventually selected a home listed for $191,000.201
Through the work of Campbell and other real estate agents, Law-
Ing and the sellers agreed to a final price of $182,500.209 Unfortu-
nately for Campbell, however, Lawing's true occupation was that
of a drug dealer; moreover, he had purchased the home with in-
come derived from his illegal drug activity 210 As a result, Campbell
was charged with one count of violating section 1956, one count
of violating section 1957, and one count of violating 18 U.S.C.§ 1001.211
At trial, the government proceeded under both an actual knowl-
edge theory and a willful-blindness theory to support its charges
under sections 1956 and 1957 212 The chief evidence supporting
the inference that Campbell knew or was willfully blind to the fact
that Lawing was a drug dealer, and correspondingly that Campbell
knew or was willfully blind to the fact that Lawing purchased the
home with the proceeds of illegal drug activity, was the following:
203. United States v. Campbell, 777 F Supp. 1259 (W.D.N.C. 1991), rev'd in part, 977
F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 122 L. Ed. 2d 716 (1993).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1260-61.
206. Id. at 1261 n.2.
207. Id. at 1261.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1261, 1268.
211. Id. at 1259.
212. Id. at 1264.
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1) Lawing " 'drove a red Porsche , owned an expensive new
motor boat , carried a portable cellular phone , flashed
$20,000 in cash , [and] drank beer away from his place of busi-
ness during the business day' ,,;"'3 2) after Lawing failed to secure
financing, he suggested that the contract purchase price of the
home be reduced to $122,500 and the remaining $60,000 be trans-
ferred to the sellers "under the table" (Lawing's suggestion was
followed); 214 3) title to the home was placed in the names of Law-
ing's parents;1 5 4) Campbell caused a false HUD-1 report to be
filed concerning the transaction;216 5) one witness testified that she
heard Campbell say that she believed drug money "may have
been" involved in the transaction;21 7 and 6) another witness testi-
fied that she heard Campbell say that "she didn't care where the
money came from."2 18 There was no evidence, however, that Law-
ing and Campbell had known each other before the transaction or
that Lawing ever told Campbell, either directly or indirectly, that
his true occupation was drug dealing.2 9 Nonetheless, the jury
found Campbell guilty under all three counts.220
The district court entered judgment of acquittal with respect to
the section 1956 and 1957 counts and conditionally granted a new
trial on those counts, on the ground that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to support the jury's finding that Campbell knew that the
funds used to buy the house were drug proceeds.22' The court's
principal concern was that the jury's finding might have been un-
duly influenced by evidence concerning Lawing's persona:
None of th[e] evidence [concerning Lawing's flashy dress and
extravagant lifestyle] proves that Mark Lawing was anything
but a spendthrift playboy who enjoyed demonstrating his
wealth, however it might have been acquired [T]he jury
may have convicted Ellen Campbell because of the outrageous
213. Id. at 1265 (quoting the Government's Brief).
214. Id. at 1261.
215. Id. at 1259.
216. Id. at 1262.
217. Id. at 1266.
218. Id.
219. In fact, the only evidence on this point was Lawing's testimony that he never told
Campbell that he was a drug dealer. Id. at 1265.
220. Id. at 1259.
221. Id. at 1269.
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and exorbitant lifestyle of Mark Lawing The court be-
lieves that the conviction of Ellen Campbell stems from undue
consideration by the jury of the conspicuous display of wealth
by Mark Lawing.222
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the entries of judgment
of acquittal but affirmed the conditional grant of a new trial.223 In
holding that the evidence was sufficient to find that Campbell
knew that drug money was involved, the court of appeals empha-
sized the irregular nature of the real estate transaction and Camp-
bell's statement that the funds "may have been drug money "224
In terms of congressional intent alone, the Fourth Circuit's rul-
ing in Campbell was incorrect. Under the circumstances, Camp-
bell's statement that the funds "may have been drug money" could
support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that she suspected
drug money was involved, but not that she knew that drug money
was involved. Likewise, although the irregular nature of the trans-
action suggested that the transaction might have been designed to
conceal or hide illegitimate funds, it also suggested that the trans-
action might have been designed to conceal or hide legitimate
funds.225 In short, the evidence before the jury raised nothing more
than a reasonable inference that Campbell realized that drug
money may have been involved-which she herself acknowledged.
The Fourth Circuit's holding thus endorses a quantum of evi-
dence-mere suspicion that illegal funds are involved-that Con-
gress repeatedly rejected as sufficient to support a conviction
under section 1957 226
Congress' clearly expressed intent is reason enough for giving
clear instructions to juries that evidence of mere suspicion is not
enough to support a conviction under section 1957 and for care-
fully reviewing any verdict of guilty under section 1957 to ensure
that the jury complied with these instructions. The need for these
222. Id. at 1265, 1269.
223. United States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 122 L. Ed. 2d
716 (1993).
224. Id. at 859-60.
225. For example, a transaction of the type in question easily suggests an effort to avoid
the payment of taxes.
226. H. REP. No. 855, supra note 8, at 13-14; 132 CONG. REC. S16,921 (daily ed. Oct. 17,
1986) (statements of Sen. Thurmond and Sen. DeConcini).
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measures is rendered all the more necessary by the need to protect
First Amendment associational values.22 Normally, the extent to
which courts should defer to jury verdicts of guilty is a question of
legislative intent and due process.228 In the case of section 1957,
however, sustaining a verdict of guilty based on insufficient evi-
dence will generally penalize a form of association protected under
the First Amendment-a consideration not present when evaluat-
ing prosecutions under most other criminal statutes. Not only is
Campbell being penalized for engaging in conduct Congress did
not intend to criminalize, she is being penalized for engaging in
associational activity protected under the First Amendment. She is
being penalized for choosing to associate with someone who fit
common stereotypes of how criminals look and act. The imposition
of criminal sanctions on that basis violates the First Amendment
right to freedom of association.22 Indeed, even if Campbell had
227. See Strafer, supra note 16, at 171.
228. The courts can never be absolutely certain that a jury's verdict of guilty reflects the
truth; therefore, the extent to which due process forbids the courts from deferring to a jury's
guilty verdict is ultimately a question of how probable it is that the jury's verdict is errone-
ous and whether as a civilized society we are willing to tolerate that probability of error.
This concept is similar to that underlying the appropriate standard of proof to be applied
by the fact finder at trial:
The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due
Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to "instruct the factfinder
concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the
correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication." The
standard serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indi-
cate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision.
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370
(1970)).
229. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 615 F.2d 311
(5th Cir. 1980). Scales concerned the constitutionality of the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385,
which prohibits, inter alia, membership in an organization advocating the overthrow of the
government by force or violence. Scales, 367 U.S. at 205. The Court held that the statute
could constitutionally reach only active members "having also a guilty knowledge and in-
tent." Id. at 228. A conviction could not be based upon passive membership, or "what other-
wise might be regarded as merely an expression of sympathy with the alleged criminal en-
terprise, unaccompanied by any significant action in its support or any commitment to
undertake such action." Id. The Court reasoned:
In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment
on a status or on conduct can only be justified by reference to the relationship
of that status or conduct to other concededly criminal activity that rela-
tionship must be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of personal
guilty [sic] in order to withstand attack under the Due Process Clause
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known that Lawing was a drug dealer, instead of merely suspecting
that he was a drug dealer, imposition of criminal liability on that
basis alone would penalize protected First Amendment activity 2 3 0
A strong tradition exists in this country that rumor, gossip, and
stereotypical notions concerning dress and persona are an im-
proper basis for forming judgments concerning whether to interact
with another person, especially in the commercial context. Cases
such as Campbell turn this tradition on its head: Campbell effec-
tively means that businesspersons are expected to make judgments
based on information of this type and will suffer criminal sanctions
if they do not.13 '
C. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
As originally proposed, section 1957 contained a provision ex-
empting "financial transactions involving the bona fide fees an at-
torney accepts for representing a client in a criminal investigation
or any proceeding arising therefrom. '232 The proponents of the at-
torneys' fees exemption had argued that it was necessary to pre-
vent section 1957 from chilling the attorney-client relationship in
Id. at 224-25.
Sawyer concerned a Florida ordinance that prohibited "loiter[ing] in any place with one
or more persons knowing that a narcotic or dangerous drug is being unlawfully used or
possessed." Sawyer, 615 F.2d at 313. The Fifth Circuit held that the ordinance violated the
First Amendment because it effectively punished one for "having the wrong kinds of friends
and for being with them on a public street." Id., see also Papachristou v. City of Jackson-
ville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (holding a loitering statute unconstitutional because, inter alia, it
encouraged suppression of the rights of minorities and other disenfranchised groups to asso-
ciate freely).
230. See Sawyer, 615 F.2d at 313.
231. Although § 1957 poses some potential threat to First Amendment associational val-
ues, the appropriate remedy is not to invalidate that statute on its face but to instead re-
quire carefully worded jury instructions and meaningful review of jury verdicts to ensure
that convictions are not based on mere suspicion that criminally derived property is in-
volved. The strong remedy of invalidating § 1957 on its face is not warranted given that the
statute can be narrowed by construction so that it does not criminalize conduct protected
under the First Amendment. See Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569
(1987) (narrowly constructing a Board of Airport Commissioners Resolution); Houston v.
Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987) (municipal ordinance); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973)
(state law).
232. The original exemption for attorney's fees read: "[Section 19571 does not apply to
financial transactions involving the bona fide fees an attorney accepts for representing a
client in a criminal investigation or any proceeding arising therefrom." H.R. REP No. 855,
supra note 8, at 1.
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criminal matters; without it, they contended, criminal defense at-
torneys might not investigate their clients' cases fully for fear of
learning information that could trigger liability under the stat-
ute.2"' Opponents of the exemption feared that its broad wording
would allow some criminal defense attorneys to further the illegal
enterprises of their clients by knowingly accepting tainted fees.23 '
In the final days before the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986
233. Representative Bill McCollum, the sponsor of the exemption, stated: " 'I am con-
cerned, as you are, I have been for some time, about the impact our statute might have on
chilling the relationships between a defense attorney in a criminal proceeding and his cli-
ent.'" Norman Lefstein, American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section Report to the
House of Delegates No. 110A, at 8 (Feb. 1987) (quoting Markup of H.R. 5077, supra note 9,
at 7).
House Report 855 further explained the purpose of the exemption:
The Subcommittee [on Crime] was aware of a potential impact upon the
exercise of the sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel in
the event of application of this offense to bona fide fees received by attorneys.
An attorney representing a person facing criminal investigation or prosecution,
in order to carry out the professional obligation to fully represent their clients,
must inquire into many aspects of a client's personal lives [sic] and financial
circumstances and thus may learn that part of the fee with which the attorney
has been paid was derived from a designated offense. The Subcommittee was
very concerned that, in the absence of this provision, the potential for such
discovery might have had the effect of inhibiting the attorney's complete inves-
tigation of the client's case (to avoid learning any information which could
have triggered this offense) and would thus have interfered with the client's
sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
H.R. REP. No. 855, supra note 8, at 14.
234. The President's Commission on Organized Crime noted that "mob-connected" law-
yers and "lawyer-criminals" use the protections afforded by the attorney-client relationship
to further their client's illegal enterprise through, inter alia, the subornation of perjury and
the obstruction of justice. CASH CONNECTION, supra note 2, at 257-58.
Representative Clay Shaw argued against the exemption for bona fide attorneys' fees:
"Now this is not an indictment of the Criminal Bar, but it is an indictment of
an ongoing relationship between drug dealers and a single lawyer that seems to
go on and on and on. And to make the monies that are paid as bona fide fees
for this particular lawyer as an exemption when he probably, more than any-
one else, should bear responsibility for knowingly taking these funds I think
would be a very bad mistake, and I would hope this committee would not ac-
cept that."
Paul G. Wolfteich, Note, Making Criminal Defense a Crime Under 18 U.S.C. Section 1957,
41 VAND. L. REv. 843, 848 n.28 (1988) (quoting Markup of H.R. 5077, supra note 9, at 6).
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was enacted, the opponents of the attorneys' fee exemption pre-
vailed and it was dropped.13 5
Nonetheless, representatives of the American Bar Association
(ABA) and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
(NACDL) immediately began urging Congress to amend sec-
tion 1957 to reinstate the attorneys' fees exemption. 3 s The ABA
and NACDL solicited the Justice Department's support for the
statutory exemption, an effort that proved unsuccessful. 3 7 Instead,
the Justice Department assured Congress that the Department's
internal prosecution standards would adequately protect the Sixth
Amendment right to effective representation in a criminal mat-
ter. 3s In 1988, Congress again chose to avoid the issue of the ex-
tent to which attorneys' fees are exempted from section 1957" Con-
235. Representative McCollum, commenting on the late-night session that produced the
final version of section 1957, stated the following with respect to the last-minute decision to
drop the attorneys' fees exemption:
I think that last night most of us working on this issue recognized that the
risk that the Department of Justice would prosecute an attorney in this cir-
cumstance was really so very remote that a special statutory exception was
really not necessary
We did not omit this provision because we have any doubts about the wis-
dom of the policy it was intended to carry out. There was concern about the
narrowness of the exception which the provision created.
132 CONG. REc. E3821 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1986).
236. The NACDL also registered its opposition when the new offense was first introduced
in the House of Representatives. See H.R. RFi. No. 855, supra note 8, at 9.
237. Id.
238. On May 6, 1987, William F Weld, Assistant Attorney General for the Department of
Justice's Criminal Division, appeared before a House subcommittee and testified in part:
Because the Department firmly believes that attorneys representing clients
in criminal matters must not be hampered in their ability to effectively and
ethically represent their clients within the bounds of the law, it is the proposed
policy of the Department that prosecutions under Section 1957 will not be
brought against attorneys based upon the receipt of property constituting bona
fide fees for the legitimate representation in a criminal matter, except if there
is clear and convincing evidence that the attorney had actual knowledge of the
illegal origin of the specific property received and such evidence does not con-
stst of confidential communications or other information obtained by the at-
torney during the representation and in furtherance of the obligation to effec-
tively represent the client.
This proposed prosecution standard applies only to fees for legal services
actually rendered in a criminal matter. Attorneys who engage in other commer-
cial transactions unrelated to the representation of a client in a criminal mat-
ter or who represent clients in civil matters should be treated as any other non-
privileged vendor of goods or services.
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gress amended section 1957 but only to provide that the term
"monetary transaction" "does not include any transaction neces-
sary to preserve a person's right to representation as guaranteed by
the sixth amendment to the Constitution.
23 9
The extent to which section 1957 threatens the Sixth Amend-
ment right to effective representation in a criminal matter is a
complicated issue that has been the subject of considerable com-
mentary and debate. 240 This Article does not purport to address
this issue exhaustively; however, it offers two specific recommenda-
tions. First, the Justice Department's standards for the prosecu-
tion of attorneys based on the receipt of bona fide fees should be
extended to the representation of clients in civil matters.24 1 The
separation of legal services into service for civil and criminal repre-
sentation is analytically unsound for purposes of determining the
extent to which section 1957 threatens the Sixth Amendment right
to effective representation in a criminal matter.
Second, Congress should amend section 1957 to incorporate the
Justice Department's standards-extended to representation in
civil matters-directly into the wording of the statute. The Justice
Money Laundering Control Act of 1986: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Crime of
the House Comm. of the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 107-08 (1987) (statement of Wil-
liam F Weld, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division) [hereinafter Money Launder-
ing Hearings].
The Justice Department guidelines that were eventually issued with respect to the appli-
cability of § 1957 to attorneys' fees were essentially the same as the proposed policy com-
municated by the Department to Congress prior to its enactment of the 1988 amendment to
section 1957. See id.
239. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(1) (1988).
Congressional hesitancy to enact a more precise statutory provision specifying the extent
to which attorneys' fees are exempted from § 1957 can probably be attributed to concern
that such a provision could appear to constituents as another example of lawyers (i.e., Con-
gress) protecting their own. Senator Dole, for example, stated:
I know there is a sixth amendment but it is going to be hard to explain
to some why we take care of lawyers, that we have a forfeiture or whatever.
They will be paid even though the money comes from drug trafficking.
We do not exempt anybody else but attorneys are exempt and as my friend
from New Hampshire [Senator Rudman] pointed out, it has been that way
forever.
134 CONG. REc. S17,303 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988).
240. E.g., Mark Irvine & Danzi King, Comment, The Money Laundering Control Act of
1986: Tainted Money and the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 19 PAc. L.J. 171 (1987); Wolfteich,
supra note 234.
241. See infra part IV.C.1.
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Department standards are not binding and therefore cannot be re-
lied on to protect the attorney-client relationship in criminal mat-
ters to the extent Congress intended. Moreover, two recent Su-
preme Court cases rejecting Sixth Amendment challenges to the
forfeiture of attorneys' fees suggest that the courts might not con-
strue section 1957's "Sixth Amendment" exception in a manner
that will effectuate Congress' intent.242 Finally, section 1957's spe-
cific reference to the Sixth Amendment could be construed as cre-
ating an unintended defense to liability under the statute-an at-
torney otherwise guilty under the statute could escape conviction
solely on the ground that he subjectively believed that receipt of
the tainted funds as fees was necessary to protect the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, regardless of whether the belief is ob-
jectively reasonable. The amending of section 1957 as suggested
should cure this problem.
1. Extension of Justice Department Prosecution Policy to
Representation in Civil Matters
Under the Department of Justice's guidelines for prosecutions
under sections 1956 and 1957, approval of the Assistant Attorney
General for the Criminal Division is required before prosecutors
may seek an indictment charging an attorney with a violation of
section 1957 based on fees paid to the attorney for representation
in a criminal or civil matter.243 Although the Department's guide-
lines do not expressly acknowledge any Sixth Amendment limita-
tion to the scope of section 1957, they implicitly suggest that un-
limited application of section 1957 to cases involving bona fide
attorneys' fees could implicate Sixth Amendment values by chil-
ling the attorney-client relationship in criminal matters:
There is no statutory prohibition upon the application of Sec-
tion 1957 to transactions involving bona fide fees paid to attor-
neys for representation in a criminal matter. However, the De-
partment recognizes that attorneys in such situations, unlike all
others who may deal with criminal defendants, may be required
to investigate and pursue matters which will provide them with
242. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989); United
States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989); infra notes 254-73 and accompanying text.
243. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, § 9-105.300.
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knowledge of the illicit source of property they receive. Indeed,
the failure to investigate such matters may be a breach of ethi-
cal standards or may result in a lack of effective assistance to
the client.244
Under the Department's policy, an attorney may not be prose-
cuted under section 1957 based on the receipt of bona fide fees
received for legitimate representation in a criminal matter unless
proof exists beyond a reasonable doubt that the attorney had ac-
tual knowledge of the illegal origin of the specific property re-
ceived. Moreover, the evidence of such knowledge must not consist
of
(a) confidential communications made by the client preliminary
to and with respect to undertaking representation in a criminal
matter, (b) confidential communications made during the
course of representation in the criminal matter, or (c) other in-
formation obtained by the attorney during the course of the rep-
resentation and in furtherance of the obligation to effectively re-
present the client.245
The term "bona fide fees" under this standard means "fees paid in
good faith without fraud or deceit for representation concerning
the defendant's personal criminal liability ")246
The chief problem with the Justice Department's standard is
that it does not apply to attorneys' fees received for representation
in a civil matter. In the Department's view, attorneys representing
clients in civil matters "should be treated as any other non-privi-
leged vendor of goods or services. "247 Undoubtedly, this position
has some theoretical appeal. The Sixth Amendment only applies to
representation related to a criminal matter.248 It thus could be ar-
gued that, from a constitutional perspective, legal services pro-
vided to a client in a civil matter are conceptually indistinguish-
able from the services provided by other vendors of goods or
244. Id. § 9-105.600.
245. Id.
246. Id. § 9-105.610.
247. Money Laundering Hearings, supra note 238, at 107-08 (statement of William F
Weld, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division).
248. The Sixth Amendment provides in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
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services. Many would contend, for example, that the services pro-
vided by doctors and accountants are as important to society as
the services provided by attorneys in a civil matter. Moreover, al-
though attorneys in civil matters often cannot perform their duties
properly without substantial freedom to investigate their client's
affairs, the same can be said of doctors and accountants. Certainly,
an attorney's representation of a client in a civil matter is the same
as the services provided by a doctor or an accountant in that none
are accorded special constitutional protection. Under this view,
therefore, Congress' enactment of section 1957 manifests a legisla-
tive policy judgment that the beneficial interests to society gained
by full application of section 1957 to all nonconstitutionally pro-
tected relationships-including the attorney-client relationship in
civil matters-outweighs the harmful effects to society that full ap-
plication of section 1957 poses to those relationships. Indeed, it
was Congress' concern that the original attorneys' fee exemption in
section 1957 would lead to special treatment for the civil aspects
of some attorney-client relationships, while other similar relation-
ships would not be exempt, that led Congress to drop the more
specific exemption for attorneys' fees that was originally pro-
posed.249
The difficulty with this view, however, is that it assumes that
legal services can always be neatly categorized as either representa-
tion in a "civil" or "criminal" matter. In the context of sec-
tion 1957, this is not the case. The consequences of section 1957
become significant to an attorney whenever he or she becomes
aware that a client is or has been engaged in criminal activity, re-
gardless of whether the client is being represented in a civil or
criminal matter. As an illustration, suppose that a law firm is re-
tained by a corporation to defend it in a civil lawsuit. In the course
of investigating the corporation's affairs to prepare a particular de-
fense, the firm's attorneys uncover information that could, but will
not necessarily, lead to knowledge that the corporation has vio-
lated, and might be continuing to violate, RICO.25 0 Further investi-
gation could lead to knowledge that the firm's fees are being paid
with funds derived from RICO activity Because the firm does not
249. See supra note 234.
250. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
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want to lose its lucrative client, and certainly seeks to avoid crimi-
nal liability under section 1957, it decides that the better course is
to continue representing its client in the civil lawsuit but to pursue
defenses less likely to uncover information establishing that its cli-
ent has engaged in criminal activity
At first glance, in this hypothetical the specter of section 1957
would seem to have resulted only in chilling effective representa-
tion in a civil matter: the firm breached its professional obligation
to represent its client effectively in the civil lawsuit.251 A closer ex-
amination, however, reveals that the specter of section 1957 has
chilled the effective representation of the client in a potential
criminal matter. The firm's premature termination of its investiga-
tion means that its client is unknowingly acting without counsel in
a criminal matter-representation that a client in this situation
could legitimately expect the law firm to provide, at least tempora-
rily, even though the firm had only been retained for a civil mat-
ter.252 Among other things, the firm's premature termination of its
investigation could result in its client's inadvertent disclosure of
information protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination and, if the client is continuing to engage in crim-
inal activity, its failure to discontinue that activity because it was
not given proper legal advice. Thus, applying section 1957 to the
receipt of bona fide attorneys' fees for representation in a civil
matter chills the Sixth Amendment right to effective representa-
tion in a criminal matter.
251. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(A) (1980) ("Except
with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if
the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be
affected by his own financial, business, property, or personal interests.").
252. Cf. Easley v. State, 334 So. 2d 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (stating that an attorney
has a duty to inform a client when he is not competent to represent the client in a criminal
matter); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. (1983) ("One of the lawyer's
functions is to advise clients so that they avoid any violation of the law in the proper exer-
cise of their rights."); id. Rule 1.1 cmt. ("In an emergency a lawyer may give advice or
assistance in a matter in which the lawyer does not have the skill ordinarily required where
referral to or consultation or association with another lawyer would be impractical.");
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A)(1) ("A lawyer shall not
[hiandle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not competent to handle,
without associating with him a lawyer who is competent to handle it.").
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2. Incorporation of Justice Department Policy Directly into
Language of Section 1957
Congress should amend section 1957 to incorporate the Justice
Department's standards (as extended to representation in civil
matters) directly into the wording of the statute. The Justice De-
partment standards are not binding25 and therefore cannot be re-
lied on to fully protect the Sixth Amendment right to effective rep-
resentation in a criminal matter. Moreover, two recent Supreme
Court cases rejecting Sixth Amendment challenges to the forfeiture
of attorneys' fees indicate that the courts might not construe sec-
tion 1957's reference to a Sixth Amendment exception in a manner
that will fully effectuate congressional intent.
The Supreme Court decided United States v. Monsanto254 and
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States2 55 on the same day
in 1989.256 Both cases concerned pretrial restraining orders, en-
tered immediately after the defendants' indictments on drug-re-
lated charges, that froze most of the defendants' assets as poten-
tially forfeitable under the drug forfeiture statute.257 In Monsanto,
the district court denied the defendant's motion to vacate the re-
straining order in order to permit him to use the frozen assets to
pay his attorney 258 An en banc panel of the Second Circuit re-
versed the district court's decision and ordered that the restraining
order be modified to allow the assets to be used to pay the attor-
ney's fees.2 59 The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and
reinstated the restraining order.260
In Caplin & Drysdale, the defendant, notwithstanding the pre-
trial restraining order, had transferred $25,000 to his attorneys for
preindictment legal services, which the attorneys placed in an es-
crow account.26' Subsequently, the defendant pleaded guilty and
253. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 3, § 9-105.500.
254. 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
255. 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
256. Both opinions were decided June 22, 1989.
257. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 619-20; Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 603-04.
258. Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 604.
259. United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1402 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc), rev'd, 491
U.S. 600 (1989).
260. Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 605-06.
261. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 620.
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his assets were declared forfeited.262 Thereafter, his attorneys peti-
tioned the district court for a share of the forfeited assets, relying
on a provision of the drug forfeiture statute that protects the prop-
erty interests of third parties in forfeitable assets that result from
bona fide transactions which the third party entered into without
reasonable cause to believe that the assets were subject to forfei-
ture.26 The attorneys sought both the $25,000 held in escrow and
an additional $170,000 for postindictment legal services.264 The
district court granted the attorneys' petition; however, the Fourth
Circuit reversed en banc, 66 a decision affirmed by the Supreme
Court.2 66
In both cases, a majority of the Supreme Court rejected the con-
tention that an exemption exists to the federal drug forfeiture stat-
ute for bona fide fees paid to an attorney for representation in a
criminal matter.26 The majority also rejected the contention that
the Sixth Amendment proscribed the forfeitures of attorneys' fees
that had been ordered in the two cases. 26 s The majority concluded
that under the relation back doctrine, a legal fiction that vests title
in forfeitable property in the United States upon commission of
the criminal acts giving rise to forfeiture, the government has sig-
nificant interests in recovering forfeitable assets that might be
used to pay an attorney 269 These interests, the majority reasoned,
are not outweighed by any chilling effect that the forfeiture of at-
torneys' fees poses to the Sixth Amendment right to effective rep-
resentation in a criminal matter, including the right to counsel of
one's choice. That right, according to the majority, extends only to
" 'the individual's right to spend his own money to obtain the ad-
vice and assistance of counsel.' ",270 Comparing a person who
262. Id. at 621.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 642-48
(4th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (recognizing no exception to the forfeiture requirement for for-
feited attorney's fees), aff'd, 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
266. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 620.
267. Id. at 622-23; United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 606-14 (1989).
268. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 628; Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 614.
269. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 627.
270. Id. at 626 (quoting Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305,
370 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
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seeks to spend forfeitable property to a bank robber who seeks to
spend funds stolen from a bank, the majority concluded that no
constitutional principle gives a person the right to spend tainted
funds, even for the purpose of retaining counsel for defense against
criminal charges:
There is no constitutional principle that gives one person the
right to give another's property to a third party, even where the
person seeking to complete the exchange wishes to do so in or-
der to exercise a constitutionally protected right. If defend-
ants have a right to spend forfeitable assets on attorneys' fees,
why not on the exercises of the right to speak, practice one's
religion, or travel? The full exercise of these rights, too, depends
in part on one's financial wherewithal; and forfeiture, or even
the threat of forfeiture, may similarly prevent a'defendant from
enjoying these rights as fully as he might otherwise. Nonethe-
less, we are not about to recognize an antiforfeiture exception
for the exercise of each such right; nor does one exist for the
exercise of Sixth Amendment rights. 17'
If the majority's reasoning in Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale
is any indication, the Supreme Court is unlikely, at least anytime
in the near future, to be receptive to arguments that the Sixth
Amendment, in and of itself, places special limitations on the
scope of section 1957 simply because bona fide attorneys' fees are
involved. The only arguable distinction between the impact of sec-
tion 1957 and the impact of civil forfeiture law on the right to
counsel of one's choice is that section 1957, unlike forfeiture law,
involves the threat of criminal sanctions.2 72 Therefore, the poten-
tial chilling effect of section 1957 on the right to counsel is ostensi-
bly greater than the potential chilling effect of forfeiture law.
271. Id. at 628.
272. As noted, § 1957 applies to profits of unlawful activity as well as property stolen or
obtained by fraud. See supra part III.A.4.b. A criminal who dissipates profits of illegal ac-
tivity, as opposed to funds stolen or obtained by fraud, is not interfering with the property
rights of another person. See supra part III.A.4.b. It could thus be argued that, in consider-
ing the extent to which the governmental interests promoted by § 1957 outweigh the First
Amendment right to freedom of association and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the
government's interests have less weight. However, Justice Blackmun made this same argu-
ment with respect to the drug forfeiture statute in Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale, an
argument ignored by the majority. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 652-53 n.15 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (combining a dissent for Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale).
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Nothing in Monsanto or Caplin & Drysdale, however, indicates
that a majority of the Supreme Court would consider this distinc-
tion significant.17 3
Without doubt, however, the very purpose of the 1988 amend-
ment to section 1957 was to limit its scope to some degree-to
whatever degree is necessary to prevent a chilling of the right to
effective representation in criminal matters. After Monsanto and
Caplin & Drysdale, which were decided after section 1957 was
amended in 1988, it seems clear that Congress must affirmatively
act if it expects section 1957 to be limited as it desires.
Even assuming that the courts will eventually establish specific
standards that effectuate Congress' intent with respect to the ap-
plicability of section 1957 to the receipt of bona fide attorneys'
fees, Congress should amend the statute to avoid the unhealthy
situation that currently exists. For one thing, it would hardly be
reassuring to an attorney convicted under section 1957 to learn
that the case had resulted in an opinion clarifying the law in this
area, but unfortunately his or her conduct fell just outside of what
the court had decided was lawful, and the conviction was therefore
upheld. Suppose, for example, that an attorney believes in good
faith, as this Article contends, that the Sixth Amendment pros-
cribes liability under section 1957 based on the receipt of bona
fide attorneys' fees in a civil matter. The attorney engages in such
a transaction and is subsequently convicted under section 1957
Later, the courts conclude that the Justice Department's prosecu-
tion standards, as currently written, strike the appropriate balance
between the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the govern-
ment's interest in crime control. The courts specifically reject the
contention that the Sixth Amendment invalidates section 1957
convictions based on the receipt of bona fide attorneys' fees in a
civil matter. Under these circumstances, is it fair to hold the attor-
ney criminally responsible when she could not have known how
section 1957 would eventually be interpreted?
273. With respect to the forfeiture of attorneys' fees, one of the only issues left open m
Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale is whether an attorney who knowingly receives tainted
property as fees must forfeit the fees even if he received them prior to the entry of a re-
straining order.
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Normally, an individual who violates the language of a criminal
statute under a good faith belief that his conduct is nevertheless
protected under the Constitution assumes the risk that the courts
might reject this constitutional view.27 4 Unlike almost any other
criminal statutes, however, section 1957 specifically includes a con-
stitutional "safe harbor" provision on its face. This could be con-
strued as allowing an attorney otherwise guilty under the statute
to escape conviction-perhaps justifiably so-on the ground that
the attorney's subjective belief was that his or her actions were
necessary to protect the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, re-
gardless of whether the belief was objectively reasonable. A similar
safe-harbor provision led the Court in Gentile v. State Bar27 5 to
reverse the conviction in that case on vagueness grounds.2 76 Gen-
tile probably is distinguishable from cases involving section 1957
because it did not concern a constitutional safe-harbor provision.
Nonetheless, no sound reason exists for allowing this unhealthy sit-
uation to continue. Congress would better -serve the public by re-
placing the Sixth Amendment exception to section 1957 with spe-
cific language stating the precise extent to which the statute
applies to the receipt of bona fide attorneys' fees.
V CONCLUSION
Congress' enactment of section 1957 is in most respects a legiti-
mate response to the growing economic power of organized crime.
Section 1957 at least has the potential to pose a significant hurdle
to the ability of professional criminals to enjoy their ill-gotten
gains or use them to further their criminal activity Nonetheless,
the particular method Congress selected to achieve this goal
274. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 204 (1991) (holding that a good faith belief
that the income tax laws were unconstitutional would not be a defense for charges of will-
fully evading income taxes and failing to file income tax returns).
275. 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991).
276. Id. at 2731. The Court reversed the imposition of sanctions against an attorney for
violating a state ethical rule that prohibited commenting on current litigation to the press.
Id. The attorney had relied on a safe-harbor provision to the general rule that allowed ex-
planation of the "general" nature of defenses without further "elaboration." Id. at 2721. The
Court concluded that the terms "general" and "elaboration," as used in the safe-harbor
provision, were classic terms of degree, with no "settled usage or tradition of interpretation
in the law." Id. at 2731.
277. Id. at 2721.
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-imposing criminal liability on bankers, merchants, and other
businesspersons who knowingly provide professional criminals with
a market for their ill-gotten gains-could have severe side effects if
not exercised carefully Unrestrained application of section 1957
could result in the conviction of innocent persons, the infringement
of constitutionally protected associational rights, and the invasion
of the Sixth Amendment right to effective representation in crimi-
nal matters. The courts should be especially vigilant when.constru-
ing section 1957's language, instructing juries, and reviewing jury
verdicts to ensure that these harmful effects do not occur.
